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**Demography and Security in Sub-Saharan
Africa**

Demografie a bezpečnost v subsaharské Africe

Diplomová práce

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Abstrakt

S ohledem na současný trend rychlého růstu počtu obyvatel, a to zejména v tzv. globálním Jihu, by se mělo otázce důsledků demografické změny pro bezpečnost dostat zvýšené pozornosti. Nedávno vzniklý obor politické demografie se sice snaží prozkoumat příčinný vztah mezi těmito dvěma faktory, ale stále existuje poměrně málo studií, které by aplikovali teorii politické demografie na konkrétní empirické případy.

V této práci jsem se z tohoto důvodu zaměřila na případ první konžské války, stejně jako na vybrané konfliktní události ve východním Kongu, jenž ji předcházely. Zprvce jsem se podívala na bezpečnostní dopady změny v struktuře obyvatelstva v koloniálním období a později v době po získání nezávislosti, zejména v provinciích Kivu nacházejících se ve východním Kongu. Zadruhé jsem zkoumala rwandskou genocidu z hlediska politické demografie. Nakonec jsem zjišťovala, jakou roli ve vypuknutí první konžské války hrála masivní rwandská uprchlická vlna do východního Konga, která vznikla v následku genocidy.

Přístup použitý ve vybrané případové studii se ukázal být užitečný, co se týče rozšíření našeho chápání příčin vypuknutí konfliktů ve sledovaném regionu, a taky dále rozvíjí teorii politické demografie upozorňováním na řadu dosud do značné míry přehlížených aspektů. Zároveň zdůrazňuje potřebu rozšířit analytický rámec teorie, a to takovým způsobem, který bude brát v úvahu jako se vnímání populačních změn, reakce na ně (zejména ze strany elit) nebo jejich manipulace a zneužívání spolupodílejí na vypuknutí konfliktu. Navrhovaná širší a poněkud konstruktivistická varianta teorie politické demografie by měla více vyhovovat studiu složitějších kauzálních mechanismů mezi změnami populace a konfliktem.

Abstract

Given the current trend of rapid population growth, especially in the global South, the question what the implications of rapid demographic change are for security

should receive increased attention. The recently established field of political demography has endeavoured to explore the causal relationship between these two factors, but still relatively few studies exist which would apply political demography theory on specific empirical cases.

In this thesis, I have therefore examined the case of the First Congo War, as well as selected conflict events in eastern Congo predating it. Firstly, I have looked at the security implications of population change in the colonial and later in the post-independence era, especially in the Kivu provinces located in eastern Congo. Secondly, I examined the Rwandan genocide from a political demography perspective. Finally, I enquired how the massive Rwandan refugee wave to eastern Congo in the aftermath of the genocide played a role in the eruption of the First Congo War.

The selected case study approach proved to be useful in both expanding our understanding of the causes of conflict outbreak in the observed region, and further developing political demography theory by drawing attention to a number of so far largely overlooked aspects. It has highlighted the need to widen the theory's analytical scope to take into account the ways in which factors such as how population change is perceived, reacted to (particularly by elites), manipulated with, and exploited, facilitate conflict eruption. The suggested broader and somewhat constructivist variant of political demography theory should be better suited to study more complex causal mechanisms between population change and conflict.

Klíčová slova

subsaharská Afrika, konflikty, demografie, geografie, bezpečnost

Keywords

Sub-Saharan Africa, conflicts, demography, geography, security

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V Praze dne 2. května 2016

.....
Valéria Bankóová

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Institut politologických studií Teze diplomové práce

Demography and Security in Sub-Saharan Africa

Introduction to the topic and theory

In recent decades, demographic shifts caused by the uneven demographic transition in the global North and South have intensified and are likely to continue up through 2050. The contrast between the North and the South in population growth and age structure is already glaring, and it could lead to further conflict over resources, or over migration flows. Demographic disparities between nation-states, age groups, rural-urban groups, and ethnic or religious groups have been among the key drivers of political change on the local level as well. Political scientists have, however, only recently started to explore the political impacts of population change, helping to create the emerging field of political demography. The foremost ambition of political demography has since been to explore how demography can further our understanding of political identities, conflict, and change.

Since approximately 1900, Africa has been experiencing one of the largest population growth spurts ever recorded. It was the last to enter the demographic transition, i.e. the high birth/low death transition phase by which countries move from a high birth/high death equilibrium to a low birth/low death equilibrium. While most developed countries, have already completed their demographic transition, and most of Latin America and East Asia are in advanced stages where fertility rates have already sharply dropped, Africa's demographic transition is only in its early phase. As a result, the continent is expected to add another 3 billion people to the world population by 2100, when its demographic transition is expected to be over. Given these circumstances of massive population change underway, the framework of political demography could be exceptionally useful to analyse political change and conflict in Africa.

It needs to be clarified early on that political demography theory does not presuppose any direct causal relationship between population and a certain political arrangement, or between population and conflict. It has already moved far ahead of the simple Malthusian model of high population density and ensuing resource scarcity

leading directly to violence. It acknowledges that high population growth can lead to violence only indirectly, and it incorporates the premises of both dominant theoretical traditions in the study of civil war – the “greed” perspective focusing on structural conditions providing opportunities to the eruption of violent action, and the “grievance” perspective which explains conflict through motivation and links it to the existence of economic or political grievances.

Political demography theory asks the question why population growth affects some areas more than others. Its proposed answer is that as long as various interactions and exchanges between diverse social groups and institutions in a certain area conform to expectations over time, we may expect to see a certain rough stability across generations. In other words, as long as proportions between different states, elites, social groups, and the output provided by the environment remain roughly the same, population growth or even decline can be accommodated. Political demography theory is thus able to introduce a new research focus on phenomena such as aging, on the relative power of different groups, or on the implications of differential growth rates between ethnic majority and minority populations.

Methodology and case selection

While there is growing literature on demographic topics with a more direct link to geopolitics and the outbreak of civil disorder and conflicts, research building on political demography theory is still surprisingly scarce. In this thesis, I have therefore chosen to apply political demography theory to the case of the prolonged conflict in Central Africa since the 1990s. My aim will be to test whether political demography theory is applicable and relevant in this specific case. I will examine whether and how population and age structure change, as well as large-scale migration of Tutsi and Hutu groups were among the key driving forces which led to destabilising ethnic conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and surrounding countries.

The selected instrumental case study approach should be helpful in filtering overarching global relationships between demography and conflict to a smaller scale. The country-level analysis of connections between population and age structure change, and other social factors on the one hand, and security on the other hand will be used to illuminate how macro-level trends, which have been verified by cross-national time-

series quantitative surveys, unfold and influence each other in individual states and among them.

To examine population change through differential fertility rates and migration, I will draw on the already outlined political demography theory by Jack A. Goldstone, the founding father of the discipline. Migratory trends will be studied especially closely as they are expected to have a strong influence on the DRC and surrounding countries' security situation. This approach should also contribute to bridging the gap between general migration study and security studies, as migration study has so far been largely isolated from the scrutiny of the political impacts of migration on sending and receiving societies.

To account for the impact of age structure change, more specifically youth bulges, in my selected case, I will apply Henrik Urdal's theory of youth bulges and political violence. According to this theory, which draws on a cross-national time-series study of the 1950-2000 period, the existence of youth bulges increases the risk of conflict outbreak significantly. I will enquire whether such youth bulges were present in the case of the DRC and what impact they had on conflict dynamics.

Apart from testing various political demography theories by means of the case study of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I would also like to problematize them. I will try to tackle one of the major points of disagreement on the plausibility of political demography theory which revolves around the issue of the direction of causality – i.e. whether population change inflicts conflict or vice versa. Furthermore, I will address the divide in opinions on the existence, as such, of causal relationship between population change and conflict, using two diverse perspectives in nationalism theory. According to the first perspective, if social groups defined by ethnic identities and religion change within the boundaries of a state, the differential ethnic growth leads inevitably to conflict (Vanhanen 1999). Contrastingly, as stated by the second perspective, ethnic boundaries are socially constructed – they are sensitive to political manipulation and relatively impervious to population shifts (Laitin 2007). I am aware that the direction of causal relationships and causality itself is always difficult to determine, nevertheless I will attempt to do so by looking at population trends as well as tendencies in the political and public discourse in the DRC and surrounding countries.

Structure

Introduction

1. Political Demography Theory

2. Historical introduction

Historical introduction to the population and political dynamics of the Congo, utilising the theories of Jeffrey I. Herbst and Elliott D. Green, who work with the implications of historically low population densities on development and conflict, respectively.

3. Conflict in Central Africa since the 1990s

Analysis of the prolonged conflict from the perspective of political demography.

3.1 First Congo War

3.2 Second Congo War

3.3 Continued conflicts

Conclusion

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Introduction

In recent decades, demographic shifts caused by the uneven global demographic transition in the global North and South have intensified and are likely to continue up through 2050. The contrast between the North and the South in population growth and age structure is already glaring, and it could lead to conflict over resources, or over migration flows. Demographic disparities between nation-states, age groups, rural-urban groups, and ethnic or religious groups have been among the key drivers of political change on the local level as well.¹ Political scientists have, however, only recently started to explore the political and security impacts of population change, helping to create the emerging field of political demography.² The foremost ambition of political demography has since been to explore how demography can further our understanding of political identities, conflict, and change. In this work, I draw on and would like to contribute to the development of this growing field.

Justification of topic and case selection

Political demographers and related professionals have in recent decades developed a number of theories focusing on the security and political implications of specific demographic phenomena. They have studied how increasing population density and size contributes to destabilisation and conflict, what implications do young populations have for security, what are the effects of (population induced) changes in resource and land distribution for relations between various societal subgroups, and how population density and distribution affects state consolidation. Still, there are relatively few studies which would apply political demography theory on specific empirical cases and thus demonstrate the causal³ relationship between demographic change and the outbreak of civil disorder and conflict. Most research in the effects of population change has been rather sociological, focusing for instance on unemployment, or environmental, concentrating on insufficient resources. This study, with its

¹ GOLDSTONE, Jack A., KAUFMANN, Eric P., and DUFFY TOFT, Monica, eds. *Political Demography: How Population Changes Are Reshaping International Security and National Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 4.

² GOLDSTONE, Jack A. "A Theory of Political Demography: Human and Institutional Reproduction." In GOLDSTONE, Jack A., KAUFMANN, Eric P., and DUFFY TOFT, Monica, eds. *Political Demography: How Population Changes Are Reshaping International Security and National Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 12.

³ It has to be clarified that political demography theory does in no way consider the causal relationship between demographic change and conflict to be direct or linear. It maintains, however, that population change in combination with certain other factors does have political and security implications. The issue of causality will be further elaborated on in the first part of this thesis.

emphasis on the security implications of demographic change, is an effort to contribute to filling this void.

To be more specific, in this thesis I have applied political demography theory on the case of the First Congo War, as well as *selected* conflict events in eastern Congo⁴ predating it. As my aim has been to scrutinize the relation between population change and conflict, I picked events which occurred in the aftermath of massive population shifts, thus largely overlooking among others the turmoil in eastern Congo, following Congolese independence, which was more of a political nature.

Throughout the thesis, I concentrate mainly on the Kivu provinces in eastern Congo and on neighbouring Rwanda, as they represent rare cases of historically high population densities in Sub-Saharan Africa, and are considered to be the cradle of numerous conflicts. In the observed area, the primary source of conflict-inducing demographic change had apparently been migration, caused mainly by population pressure and conflict in adjacent regions. The periodical migratory waves into the already densely populated eastern Congo dramatically altered its population structure and density, and were on several occasions followed by violent conflict within a very short period of time. Therefore, the selected case appears to be suitable to test, whether political demography theory's assumption of rapid population change having political and security repercussions holds ground in empirical studies.

It is true that migration is only one of the key elements of populations change and thus not the sole factor examined by political demography theory. The theory's scope is much broader, it explores how changes in proportion between different societal subgroups (caused by differential fertility rates and migration) and unmet expectations can result in violent conflict. In the case of eastern Congo, however, the primary focus on the large-scale migration of especially Hutu and Tutsi groups appears justifiable, as to a large extent it accounts for the swift population changes (both in size and structure) that occurred in the region. By extension, I have expected migratory trends to have a strong explanatory value when it comes to security dynamics in the area, and thus their analysis in this thesis is prominent.

I have also chosen the eastern Congo region on its own right, for it was arguably the epicentre of the First and Second Congo War, the magnitude of which is outstanding in the continent's history. The outbreak of the Congo wars has been frequently explained through a

⁴ In this work, I will use the term "eastern Congo" to denote the eastern part of the contemporary Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which was known as the Republic of Zaire between 1971 and 1997.

failed state,⁵ ethnic heterogeneity, or economic framework, in the case of the latter usually with an emphasis on natural resources.⁶ I believe that complementing these certainly significant analytical frames by political demography can enhance our understanding of the studied conflicts and area.

As for the specific time frame of this thesis, I do not aim at providing a full chronological overview of the turbulent period of strained relations and occasionally upflaring tensions between different ethnic groups which preceded the First Congo War. Nor do I offer a full account of the Congo wars themselves. I rather concentrate, within the outlined timeframe, on instances when rapid population change may have played a role in inflicting conflict. In other words, I focus on cases when political demography theory may be relevant in furthering our understanding of the causes of conflict outbreak.

Objectives

My aim in this thesis is twofold. Firstly, I would like to offer a different explanation for, and further our understanding of the eruption of violent conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC; known as the Republic of Zaire between 1971 and 1997)⁷ in recent decades. To this end, I examine whether and how population and age structure change, as well as large-scale migration of Hutu and Tutsi groups were among the key driving forces which led to destabilising ethnic conflicts in the area. While doing so, I devote special attention to the eruption of the First Congo War.

I provide in no way a full causal explanation for the incidence of these conflict events; instead I point out how changing populations and expectations can be among their catalysts and how they can influence the course of events in a significant manner. With respect to this first objective, I argue that it is worth to look at demographic data when researching the reasons of violent conflict, especially when population change is as significant and rapid as in the case of eastern Congo. Demographic factors are one of the determining features of conflict outbreak and development, as well as of states' internal stability, and thus their analysis is very useful in fostering our comprehension of security dynamics.

⁵ For instance ROTBERG, Robert I., ed. *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*. Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution Press, 2003.

⁶ For instance ROSS, Michael L. "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases." *International Organization*. Vol. 58, No. 1 (2004): 35-67.

⁷ For the sake of brevity, I will refer to this political entity as "the Congo", or as "Zaire" when in relation to the Mobutu regime.

Secondly, I would like to test the applicability and explanatory relevance of political demography theory. Moreover, I attempt to further develop the theory by drawing attention to some neglected aspects, based on the findings of this case study.

I have applied three major theoretical models of political demography on my case study. I have examined the development before the First Congo War through the lens of Elliott Green's theory of "sons of the soil conflicts," as it is concerned with disputes over land between local and migrant populations, which were not infrequent in this period. To analyse the implications of the massive migration wave into eastern Congo in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, I have drawn on Jack A. Goldstone's theory on the relation between population change (including population change inflicted by migration) and conflict. To account for the impact of age structure change, more specifically the incidence of youth bulges, in my case study, I have applied Henrik Urdal's theory of youth bulges and political violence. I have also drawn heavily on the work of Jeffrey Herbst concerning the relation between population distribution and citizenship patterns on the one hand, and state consolidation on the other hand. I have utilised these theories to bring new insights into conflict dynamics in eastern Congo, while at the same time testing their explanatory value for my selected case.

The above mentioned theories all fall within political demography theory in that they analyse the political and security implications of demographic phenomena. While their main objects of interest differ (for instance youth bulges in Urdal's theory, or resource and land distribution in Green's), all models attempt to find conditions and ways in which these phenomena affect the political and security arena. Especially the first three theories, belonging to the field of political demography in a narrower sense, attempt to answer one of the central questions of political demography theory: Why population change affects some areas more than others?

In its response, political demography theory suggests that changing relative power and resource distributions, as well as unmet expectations resulting from demographic shifts, play a significant role in strengthening the security implications of population change. Migration which alters the ethnic balance of a region is seen as equally important. Apart from these factors, political demography theory also takes into account contextual factors, such as state fragility, economic situation, or ethnic heterogeneity. It places, however, very little emphasis on the role of elite leadership in exploiting, through their action and discourse, the effects of demographic change. In my case study, I have therefore attempted to problematize political demography theory by asking the question whether population change as such inflicts

conflict, or rather elite mobilization does so, on the basis of changing demographic circumstances. I have looked at political discourse involving demographic figures, especially through the “numbers game”⁸ between the adversaries in the First Congo War. I have thus attempted to further develop political demography theory by drawing attention to the political use of demographic figures and its implications.

With respect to this second objective, I argue that population change *per se*, as well as the way population change was perceived, manipulated, and reacted to, all played major roles in enabling the eruption of the conflict. This broader constructivist approach to the analysis of to the role of demography in politics and security has a potential to bring new insight into both the beginning of the First Congo War and into the complex causal mechanism between population change and conflict.

Methodology

To examine the applicability and explanatory value of political demography theory for a specific empirical case, I have chosen to use an instrumental case study approach, as it should be helpful in filtering overarching global relationships between demography and conflict to a smaller scale.⁹ The local-level analysis of connections between population and age structure change, as well as other social factors on the one hand, and security on the other hand, has been used to illuminate how macro-level trends explored by political demography unfold and influence each other in the selected empirical case of eastern Congo.

The main challenges throughout the analysis have been a general unreliability of data caused by statistical errors, unavailable population censuses, and not least by the falsification of data. This last defect can, however, be regarded as an opportunity to examine how different actors manipulate with data in their discourse, as well as how such discourse can be exploited for the purpose of mobilisation. Another difficulty arises with the issue of causality. In order to address this hurdle, while researching the relationship between population change and conflict, I also take into account other independent variables, with which the given theoretical models of political demography operate. I attempt to further refine the causal logic offered by

⁸ REYNTJENS, Filip. *The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 86.

⁹ LEAHY MADSEN, Elizabeth. “Age Structure and Development through a Policy Lens.” In GOLDSTONE, Jack A., KAUFMANN, Eric P., and DUFFY TOFT, Monica, eds. *Political Demography: How Population Changes Are Reshaping International Security and National Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 86.

political demography theory; it is, however, hardly possible to account for all independent variables and thus exclude all errors in the causal reasoning of this study.

As for the available literature on the topic, research focusing on the consequences of demographic change has mostly dealt with issues such as the environment or resource scarcity. More recently, with raising concerns over the security implications of rapid population growth, demographic change has been increasingly correlated with the incidence of conflict. Pioneering studies have appeared also on the issue of “demographic engineering,” i.e. the population strategies of states and elites in ethnic conflict, including the addition or subtraction of human groups inhabiting their territories.¹⁰ The eruption of civil conflicts, such as those in eastern Congo, have been usually explained within greed/grievance, failed state, economic, or ethnic frameworks. In the case of the Congo, the role of globalisation (especially the influence of large corporations) and of the withdrawal of American support and assistance of international financial institutions from the Mobutu regime are often highlighted.¹¹ To be clear, I do not wish to downplay the significance of these theories and explanatory frameworks, or supplement them by political demography theory. I would rather like to complement them and correct instances when they were overemphasised.

Structure

In the first section of this thesis, I would like to introduce the field of political demography by providing an overview of existing scholarship. I present some of the most fundamental works creating the premises of political demography theory, as well as one theory closely related to the field. In the second practical part, I apply and test political demography theory on my selected case. In the conclusion, I make suggestions on developing this theory by drawing attention to some so far overlooked aspects, based on the findings and observations made in my case study.

¹⁰ WEINER, Myron, TEITELBAUM, Michael S. *Political Demography, Demographic Engineering*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2001, xi.

¹¹ CLARK, John F., ed. *The African Stakes of the Congo War*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, 2-3.

1. Political Demography Theory

The main objective of political demography is to explore the political impacts of population change. More specifically, it has been defined as “the study of the size, composition, and distribution of population in relation to both government and politics.”¹² While the field of political demography is strongly under-represented in political science, several works exist which enquire how demography can further our understanding of socio-political dynamics, conflict, and identities. Scholars of political demography have been seeking answers for the questions how population change influences politics and security, as well as why population growth affects – in a political sense – some areas more than others. They have been searching for the underlying conditions under which demographic change has social, political, and security implications. As the discipline of political demography is relatively new, the theory of political demography has to be assembled from a number of pivotal works by various authors. In this section, I will therefore introduce some of the most fundamental of these works and thus summarise the basic tenets of political demography theory. I also include a theory closely related to the field. In the second part of this thesis, I will then apply and test political demography theory on my selected case. In the conclusion, I will make suggestions on developing this theory and draw attention to some of its neglected aspects, based on the findings of this study.

It needs to be clarified early on that political demography theory does not presuppose any direct causal relationship between population and conflict or between population and a certain political arrangement. It has already moved far ahead of the simple Malthusian model of high population density and ensuing resource scarcity leading directly to violence.¹³ Malthus’s model was based on the reasoning that unchecked population growth would be exponential, while food production could increase only arithmetically, causing food insufficiency and human suffering. Ideas on reaching the ultimate carrying capacity of the Earth resurfaced most prominently at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s. The ensuing neo-Malthusian literature predicted “starvation of tragic proportions”¹⁴ as a result of increasing population exceeding the Earth’s resource base, which would in turn lead to violent conflict.¹⁵

¹² WEINER, Myron, and TEITELBAUM, Michael S. *Political Demography and Demographic Engineering*. New York: Bergahn Books, 2001, 11-12.

¹³ GREEN, Elliott. “The Political Demography of Conflict in Modern Africa.” *London School of Economics and Political Science, Development Studies Institute*, Working Paper Series No. 10-111. March 2010, 3 [accessed 10.2.2016]. Available from: <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/41250/1/WP111.pdf>.

¹⁴ EHRLICH, Paul R. *The Population Bomb*. New York: Ballantine, 1968, xi.

¹⁵ URDAL, Henrik. “People vs. Malthus: Population Pressure, Environmental Degradation, and Armed Conflict Revisited.” *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 42, No. 4 (2005): 418.

On the other end of the spectrum of those studying the relations between resource availability and conflict, cornucopians, or resource optimists, argued that it is the abundance of valuable natural resources, and not scarcity that leads to violent conflict.¹⁶ This claim was based on the reasoning that the possession of rich natural resources (such as gems, rich arable land, or drugs) is an incentive to armed conflict due to actors' greed, or due to the opportunity they constitute to financing further exploits.¹⁷

Contemporary political demography moves beyond the study of environmental and resource-oriented consequences of population increase and draws our attention to socio-political ones. It also rejects the notion of food and resource scarcity leading directly to popular unrest and conflict. It acknowledges that high population growth can lead to violence only indirectly, and explores conditions under which certain causal relationship between the two is discernible. This indirect approach is already apparent in the moderate neo-Malthusian works of Thomas Homer-Dixon, who upheld that increased environmental scarcity is likely to have social ramification which in turn raise the risk of internal violent conflict.¹⁸

Political demography theory takes into consideration both the already mentioned resource scarcity and abundance hypotheses describing the eruption of violent conflict. Thus, if shifted beyond the basic resource-violence explanatory scheme, political demography theory incorporates the premises of both dominant theoretical traditions in the study of civil war – the “greed” perspective focusing on structural conditions providing opportunities to the outbreak of violent action, and the “grievance” perspective which explains conflict through motivation and links it to the existence of economic or political grievances.¹⁹ Political demography theory has thus a potential to reconcile these two competing traditions by assigning in its models a significant role to both motive and opportunity reasoning.

As has been shown by this introductory section, political demography theory does not by far concern only the conflict potential of different degrees of resource availability, or of the environmental concerns related to population change. Contrastingly, it has a potential to introduce a new research focus on the security implications of phenomena such as aging,

¹⁶ BOSERUP, Ester, SCHULTZ, T. Paul, eds. *Economic and Demographic Relationships in Development*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.

¹⁷ URDAL, Henrik. “People vs. Malthus,” 419.

¹⁸ HOMER-DIXON, Thomas E. *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.

¹⁹ URDAL, Henrik. “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence.” *International Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 50 (2006): 609.

changing population structures, relative power of different groups, or differential growth rates between ethnic majority and minority populations.²⁰

1.1. Goldstone's theory of political demography

The main focus of the political demography theory of Jack A. Goldstone, the “founding father” of the discipline,²¹ is how population affects political systems. He understands political systems as “nested hierarchies” incorporating and connecting social groups and institutions.²² The author also argues that when researching the effects of demographic change, it is insufficient to look at the proportional changes of the overall population size relative to all available environmental resources. He shows that the changes and dynamics of the distribution of resources among the various segments of society have equally important political impacts. Goldstone's study of political demography therefore moves on from examining the ratio of the total population to the overall resources, and focuses on what impact changing sizes of societal subgroups have on political power and resource distribution.²³

Political demography asks the question why population growth affects (especially in a political sense) some areas more than others.²⁴ Goldstone's proposed answer is that as long as various interactions and exchanges between diverse social groups and institutions in a certain area “conform to expectations over time, we may expect to see a certain rough stability across generations.” In other words, as long as proportions between different states, elites, social groups, and the output provided by the environment remain roughly the same, population growth or even decline can be accommodated.²⁵ As a consequence, in order for population change to inflict social upheaval or political shift, the relative power positions of different groups, as well as the flow or distribution of resources, need to be substantially altered.²⁶

²⁰ HOWE, Neil, JACKSON, Richard. “Demography and Geopolitics: Understanding Today's Debate in Its Historical and Intellectual Context.” In GOLDSTONE, Jack A., KAUFMANN, Eric P., and DUFFY TOFT, Monica, eds. *Political Demography: How Population Changes Are Reshaping International Security and National Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 36.

²¹ GOLDSTONE, Jack A., KAUFMANN, Eric P., and DUFFY TOFT, Monica, eds. *Political Demography: How Population Changes Are Reshaping International Security and National Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 4.

²² GOLDSTONE, Jack A. “A Theory of Political Demography: Human and Institutional Reproduction.” In GOLDSTONE, Jack A., KAUFMANN, Eric P., and DUFFY TOFT, Monica, eds. *Political Demography: How Population Changes Are Reshaping International Security and National Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 10-11.

²³ GOLDSTONE, Jack A. “A Theory of Political Demography,” 12.

²⁴ GREEN, Elliott. “The Political Demography of Conflict in Modern Africa,” 3.

²⁵ GOLDSTONE, Jack A. “A Theory of Political Demography,” 22.

²⁶ GOLDSTONE, Jack A. “A Theory of Political Demography,” 24.

With respect to the complex question of the security implications of population change, Goldstone tries to assemble a set of hypotheses exploring causality between these two domains. The first one is that population growth inflicts environmental degradation *but* this does not usually trigger conflict, only brings misery. Here he disputes Homer-Dixon's tenet of armed conflict arising from environmental change,²⁷ and contrastingly argues that environmental factors are much less important than population-growth-inflicted economic and political aspects in bringing about violent conflict.

His second proposition is that population growth can trigger conflict over resources and farmland *if* elites want to take these away from popular groups, *or if* there is competition between different elites over the control of resources. Violent conflict stemming from population growth is thus, according to Goldstone, determined by relations between social groups, elites, and institutions,²⁸ and the eruption of violence necessitates elite leadership, mobilization, as well as some degree of state vulnerability and internal division. He recognises that states that are fiscally sound, free of international threats and supported by elites, are extremely impervious to all sorts of violence or popular discontent; and he concedes that the mere facts of poverty and inequality, or their increases, do not lead to political or ethnic violence.²⁹

Goldstone's third hypothesis states that population growth and density cannot predict political upheaval *but* specific demographic changes, such as rapid growth in labour force or in educated youth, unequal growth rates between different ethnic groups, urbanization exceeding employment growth, or migration changing ethnic balance, *are* strongly associated with political instability and constitute risk factors for violent conflict.³⁰ While he specifies some demographic phenomena which facilitate mobilisation for social or political conflict (for instance when one ethnic group migrates into the area of another and challenges its dominance),³¹ he calls for caution when determining the implications population variables have on conflict. He recognises that "demographic factors are only a part of the complex causal forces behind violent conflicts."³²

²⁷ HOMER-DIXON, Thomas. "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict." *International Security*. Vol. 16 (1991): 76-116.

²⁸ GOLDSTONE, Jack A. "Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent Conflict." *Journal of International Affairs*. Vol. 56, No. 1 (2002): 4-6.

²⁹ GOLDSTONE, Jack A. "Population and Security," 8.

³⁰ GOLDSTONE, Jack A. "Population and Security," 4-5.

³¹ Another example might be a permanent mismatch between employment prospects and the size and nature of labour force as a result of a surge in the number of youth with advanced education in the context of a limited structure of elite positions and near impossible social mobility.

³² GOLDSTONE, Jack A. "Population and Security," 12-14.

The fourth hypothesis assumes that domestic political crises produced by population changes can increase the risk of international war; and that the intensity of war (in terms of the number of war casualties) increases in countries which have large youth cohorts.³³ Goldstone thus attempts to establish a relationship between demographic factors, especially age structure, and lethality of conflict. The influence of a very young population on the incidence and escalation of conflict has been the research focus of another major representative of the field of political demography, Henrik Urdal, and will be addressed later on.

Goldstone's two remaining propositions view demographic changes as indicators and as outcomes of violent political conflict, respectively. Based on empirical evidence, he argues that rising infant mortality can be an indicator of coming political violence.³⁴ Similarly on the basis of empirical observations, he finds that population changes can also be the outcome of violent conflict, and thus he points out the fact that the relation between demographic change and violent conflict is in no way unidirectional.³⁵

In his works, Goldstone provided us with the most comprehensive account of political demography theory so far. The following two sections will introduce authors who specialised on some of the issues which have been already touched upon, grounding their research on the findings and premises of Goldstone's political demography theory.

1.2. *Green's theory of "sons of the soil conflicts"*

One of the major specialised theoretical models in the field of political demography has been introduced by the development expert Elliott D. Green. It focuses on so-called "sons of the soil conflicts," which arise when rapid population growth combined with migration flows disrupt existing structures of communal land ownership and serve as incentives to future conflicts.

Green grounds his analysis in Sub-Saharan Africa. He argues that pre-colonial Africa's population density was relatively low, the political and economic consequences of which were poverty, a communal and unequal property rights system, and great ethnic diversity.³⁶ Since the early 20th century, however, Africa has been experiencing one of the largest population growth spurts ever recorded. The continent was the last to enter the so-

³³ GOLDSTONE, Jack A. "Population and Security," 11.

³⁴ ESTY, Daniel et al. *Working Papers: State Failure Task Force Report*. McLean, VA: Science Application International Corporation, 1995.

³⁵ GOLDSTONE, Jack A. "Population and Security," 17.

³⁶ GREEN, Elliott. "The Political Demography of Conflict in Modern Africa," 4.

called demographic transition, i.e. the high birth/low death transition phase, through which societies move from a high birth/high death equilibrium to a low birth/low death equilibrium. The quick shift from low to higher population densities, through a period of high population growth over the past century, left African societies with little time to adjust to the new political, economic, and social conditions. Rural population density has been steadily growing and many rural Africans could not access enough land in their tribal areas to sustain themselves. This led to increased rural-rural labour migration, in the course of which migrants from more densely populated areas, and thus often with higher human capital levels, disrupted the lives and the fragile economic and ethnic balance of indigenous populations, causing resentment and even skirmishes among them. In this way, numerous “sons of the soil conflicts” over land developed between natives and migrants across the continent.³⁷

Green has been the first to explain the origins of this type of conflict through a political demography framework. While researching the causes of “sons of the soil conflicts,” he devoted thorough attention to cases when initial low population density and subsequent high population growth did not lead to civil strife. He recognised that apart from opportunities and motives, collective action and mobilisation are also necessary for the eruption of conflict over land. While certain preconditions, such as high population growth and migration, which increase the demand for local resources, especially land; or poverty, which lowers the opportunity cost of engaging in violence, are necessary for “sons of the soil conflicts” to develop, they are not sufficient. Conflicts over land show greater propensity for violence when natives and settlers are from different ethnic groups, while ethnic homogeneity may have a dampening effect. The main reasons for this are that ethnic diversity provides for collective action and that unequal distribution of land between various groups intensifies motivations for engaging in violence to gain land.³⁸

With his work on “sons of the soil conflicts,” Green has contributed to exploring one of the pivotal questions of the field of political demography: why population growth affects the security situation in some parts of the world more than in others? He makes the case for high population growth leading to violent conflict only indirectly, in his model mainly through high salience of group cleavages and unequal access to resources, especially land. In his analysis of contemporary African conflicts, Green points out that natural resources and oil as sources of conflict have been overshadowing the way poverty, land ownership, ethnicity

³⁷ GREEN, Elliott. “The Political Demography of Conflict in Modern Africa,” 9-12.

³⁸ GREEN, Elliott. “The Political Demography of Conflict in Modern Africa,” 13.

and demographic change lead to violence, and explores how demographic factors can be helpful in furthering our understanding of African conflict.

1.3. Urdal's theory of youth bulges and political violence

Unlike Goldstone and Green, Urdal's theory does not address the consequences of population change or growth for security, but it seeks to explore causal relationships between a population's specific age structure and conflict. The main assertion of Urdal's theory is that the existence of a youth bulge, i.e. an unusually high proportion of youths aged 15 to 24 relative to the total adult population (15 years and above), increases the risk of conflict eruption significantly. His theory draws on a quantitative cross-national time-series study of the 1950-2000 period, which looks at the relationship between youth bulges and various manifestations of political violence.³⁹

In his research, Urdal has shown that the existence of youth bulges increases both the motive and opportunity for the outbreak of violent conflict. With his work, he reacted at existing observations that young males are the main perpetrators of criminal⁴⁰ as well as political violence.⁴¹ He also further developed some of the most prominent quantitative studies on the causes of civil war onset,⁴² which have, however, neglected the role of youth bulges in political violence. He tested his youth bulge hypothesis for a large-*N* sample of low-intensity conflict data, as well as relevant contextual factors.⁴³

Urdal's hypothesis that the incidence of youth bulges increases the probability of political violence rests on the synthesis of two of the dominant theoretical traditions in the study of civil war, one focusing on opportunity (greed perspective) and the other on motive (grievance perspective) for conflict.⁴⁴ Both of these theoretical frameworks attempt to explain the incidence of conflict by focusing on political, economic, and social structural conditions.

The opportunity literature, represented most prominently by Collier and Hoeffler, has its origins in economic theory and emphasises the role of structural factors in providing opportunities (especially financial means) for a rebel group to fight. In relation to the existence of relatively large youth cohorts, the greed perspective suggests that it may play a

³⁹ URDAL, Henrik. "A Clash of Generations?" 614-615.

⁴⁰ NEAPOLITAN, Jerome L. *Cross-National Crime: A Research Review and Sourcebook*. Westport: Greenwood, 1997, 92.

⁴¹ ELBADAWI, Ibrahim, SAMBANIS, Nicholas. "Why Are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa? Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict." *Journal of African Economies*. Vol. 9 (2000): 253.

⁴² such as Collier and Hoeffler (2004), State Failure Task Force Report (Esty et al., 1998)

⁴³ URDAL, Henrik. "A Clash of Generations?" 607-608.

⁴⁴ URDAL, Henrik. "A Clash of Generations?" 610.

role in reducing the cost of rebellion. The reason behind is that with an abundant supply of rebel labour with low opportunity cost, recruitment becomes less costly and the risk of armed conflict increases. In other words, young rebel recruits see the potential gains from joining to be much higher than the possible costs, and thus they will prefer joining the conflict over alternative ways of earning a living.⁴⁵ The greed perspective further maintains that opportunity for rebellion can be boosted by the government's weakness as well.⁴⁶

The motive perspective has its roots in relative deprivation theory and sees the outbreak of various rebellions as a consequence of serious economic or political grievances. It views political violence as a rational reaction to such injuries.⁴⁷ The grievance tradition focuses mainly on two types of motives for political violence: economic, such as poverty, inequality, or economic decline; and political, for instance a lack of representation for various subgroups of the society, or an absence of a democratic system. Large youth cohorts often face challenges stemming from political and economic realities, such as high unemployment, institutional obstacles, or crowding in urban centres. In turn, the aggravation originating from such conditions boosts the chances of the eruption of political violence. Urdal emphasises, however, that the "existence of serious grievances is not sufficient for collective violent action to erupt." He upholds that the "likelihood that motives are redressed through political violence increases when opportunity arises from availability of financial means, low costs or a weak state."⁴⁸ He thus offers a synthesis of the motive and opportunity traditions to explaining the outbreak of political violence.

Urdal realises, that age structure is not a sufficient condition for creating risk of political violence. In his research of youth bulges, he therefore seeks to identify contextual factors and underlying social conditions which might interact with the incidence of relatively large youth cohorts in making involvement in an insurgency a viable or even appealing option. One such feature is a background of continued high fertility and high dependency rates. Countries well underway in their demographic transitions with growing working-age population and shrinking dependency burden are generally associated with economic growth, greater employment and income prospects, and consequently also rising costs of rebel labour. Therefore, they are likely to experience a so-called "peace dividend." Contrastingly, countries

⁴⁵ COLLIER, Paul. "Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective." In BERDAL, Mats, MALONE, David M., eds. *Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000.

⁴⁶ COLLIER, Paul, HOFFLER, Anke. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers*. Vol. 56 (2004): 563–595.

⁴⁷ GURR, Ted Robert. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.

⁴⁸ URDAL, Henrik. "A Clash of Generations?" 610.

with large youth cohorts and continued high fertility encounter political violence with higher probability.⁴⁹

Economic climate at the time when large youth cohorts enter into the labour market is of vital importance as well. When youth bulges coincide with low economic growth or even decline, the link with civil wars is especially strong. On the motive side, significant under- or unemployment, especially among educated youth, generates deep frustration, meagre income prospects, and despair, which are moving youth towards violence.⁵⁰ From the opportunity perspective, in such context it is easier to mobilise youth to join rebellions due to low opportunity costs, fewer responsibilities, and opportunism.⁵¹

Urdal further argues that regime type is also a major factor interacting with youth bulges in instigating political violence. He discovers an “inverse U-shaped relationship between regime type and conflict, meaning intermediary regimes are more conflict prone than democracies and autocracies.”⁵² He finds that recent conflict history is also a significant feature increasing the risk of a new conflict onset. Contrastingly, access to emigration seems to decrease the violent potential of youth bulges.

Urdal concedes, that regime type and the level of development may be more significant in accounting for the eruption of political violence, but he maintains that the effect of youth bulges is not to be overlooked either. He calls for further study of the structural causes of political violence, as recognising them could empower us to diminish the related risk factors.⁵³

1.4. Herbst’s theory on the impact of population distributions on state consolidation

Another seminal theory related to the field of political demography and seeking to explain the process of state consolidation in Africa has been developed by the American political scientist Jeffrey Herbst. In his work, he analyses the implications of historically low population densities and of specific population distributions for state consolidation. He asserts that the greatest challenge for state-building is posed by areas with low population densities,

⁴⁹ URDAL, Henrik. “A Clash of Generations?” 610-611.

⁵⁰ AZENG, Therese F., YOGO, Thierry U. “Youth Unemployment And Political Instability In Selected Developing Countries.” *African Development Bank*, Working Paper Series No. 171 (2013): 3 [accessed 22.2.2016]. Available from:

http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Working_Paper_171_-_Youth_Unemployment_and_Political_Instability_in_Selected_Developing_Countries.pdf.

⁵¹ GREEN, Elliott. “The Political Demography of Conflict in Modern Africa,” 11.

⁵² URDAL, Henrik. “A Clash of Generations?” 619.

⁵³ URDAL, Henrik. “A Clash of Generations?” 623.

especially if they are distant and difficult to access, as it is more expensive to exert control over them.⁵⁴

Apart from the costs of expanding control, Herbst also establishes the nature of the buffer mechanisms of the state and the nature of the regional state system as basic dynamics of state consolidation in Africa.⁵⁵ He examines these dynamics in the pre-colonial, colonial, as well as post-colonial period.

He finds that in the pre-colonial era land was abundant and thus not so valuable. The prevailing low productivity agriculture implied that people frequently moved to new territories (for instance due to soil exhaustion or dissatisfaction with their ruler), and that there was less surplus to tax, raising collection costs.⁵⁶ Consequently, cost calculations directed leaders to factually control only a political core of the area they nominally ruled. Due to soft boundaries and a lack of buffer mechanisms, African states could do little to regulate the flows of people and money, and state consolidation was influenced more by the reproductive and locational decisions of their populations than by the actions of governments.⁵⁷

In the colonial era, the direct control of vast hinterlands proved to be problematic as well. The costs of extending rule remained high, and migration continued to be the traditional African response to political distress. For the first time in African history, however, territorial boundaries acquired salience.⁵⁸ The post-colonial era is characterised by the retention of the borders demarcated by the colonialists. These hard boundaries have proved to be extraordinarily effective in preserving the integrity of African states.⁵⁹

In his monography, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (2000), Herbst develops a typology of African countries, based on the population distribution within their territory. He recalls Gottmann's classic study which asserts that "it is the *organization of a territory by its population* that counts more than any other feature of it."⁶⁰ He splits the studied Sub-Saharan African countries into four categories. The first are "Countries with Difficult Political Geographies". They are characterised as mostly large, with areas of high population density which are not contiguous. They also show an unusually

⁵⁴ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014, 11.

⁵⁵ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 23.

⁵⁶ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 39.

⁵⁷ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, xxvii, 55-56.

⁵⁸ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 88-94.

⁵⁹ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 134-135.

⁶⁰ GOTTMANN, Jean. *The Significance of Territory*. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1973, 107.

complex ethnic composition, due to extensive population distribution.⁶¹ Owing to their political geographies, it is exceptionally difficult to consolidate power in states falling into this category.

The second group is termed “Hinterland Countries”. They are large by African standards, with areas of high and medium population density stretched across relatively small portions of their territory. The rest of these states is made up of vast hinterlands where few people live. These areas are almost impossible to govern but due to the small number of people inhabiting them, they do not pose serious difficulties.⁶²

In the case of “Countries with Favorable Political Geographies”, the highest concentration of power is found in one area, usually around the capital. As distance from the capital increases, population densities become gradually lower. They also tend to be quite small. This category includes also a set of countries which are so small that their population distribution becomes largely irrelevant. Given their small size, they do not represent an obstacle to the extension of authority and their population distribution is favourable to political consolidation.⁶³ The last group is formed by “Countries with Neutral Political Geographies” which do have dispersed populations, but the distribution of these populations is not as discontinuous as in the case of the first category. They also do not have as prominent hinterlands as “Hinterland Countries”.⁶⁴

In his analysis, Herbst devotes much attention to population movements and the concept of citizenship as well. After gaining independence, the nature of population movements across the African continent changed significantly. Due to the firmness of boundaries, the concept of citizenship quickly acquired salience.⁶⁵ Foreigners and citizens were increasingly distinguished, casting aside an old tradition of welcoming strangers and terminating traditional migration patterns. This trend has been well demonstrated on numerous occasions by the emergence of mass expulsion orders. Those leaving their country of origin have been increasingly perceived in the post-colonial era as refugees, who should remain in camps located in the border area until they can be repatriated. Under these circumstances, new arrivals have had very limited options to settle down permanently in their asylum countries, especially compared to pre-independence standards.⁶⁶

⁶¹ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 145-146.

⁶² HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 152.

⁶³ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 154-155.

⁶⁴ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 159.

⁶⁵ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 227.

⁶⁶ ROGGE, John R. “Refugee Migration and Resettlement.” In CLARKE, John I., KOSINSKI, Leszek A., eds. *Redistribution of Population in Africa*. London: Heinemann, 1982, 39-40.

Unlike most theories described above, Herbst sees the effects of population increase and growing urbanisation rates rather optimistically. He acknowledges that such changes may bring along economic challenges, have implications for long-term stability and for the environment, as well as escalate societal tension due to increasingly young populations. In case the economy would be able to contain the demographic growth, however, the shift from demographic sparseness to larger population density should, according to Herbst, enable the state to better control its populations. Likewise, with advancing urbanisation more citizens are concentrated near the security and regulatory apparatuses of the state, thus offering it an opportunity to have greater influence over a larger share of its population.

Importantly, Herbst contends that geographic and demographic realities are not destinies for African states. He emphasises that they represent only certain predispositions, which are, however, strongly dependent on the actions and decisions of leaders.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, xxvii-xxviii.

2. Case study

In the second part of this thesis, I highlight and analyse instances of population change in the area and vicinity of eastern Congo which possibly inflicted violent conflict. I do so through a framework of political demography theory, as well as a historical and geopolitical analysis. First, I focus on the pre-colonial and colonial era in eastern Congo, followed by an account of relevant conflict events following independence. Later on, I devote special attention to the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath and implications for eastern Congo. Finally, I turn to a scrutiny of the First Congo War, from a political demography perspective.

2.1. Colonial era

Large-scale population movement in Africa is arguably as old as the continent itself. People routinely moved to new territories in search for better soil, new pastures, or to avoid the dominion of unpopular rulers.⁶⁸ Periodical population movements in eastern Congo were further inflated in the sixteenth century with the expansion of slave trade. Up until the nineteenth century, when most slave trade was officially abolished, millions of slaves were exported from the region by Arab slave traders from Zanzibar for the Indian Ocean slave trade, as well as by traders from the Kingdom of Kongo for the Atlantic Ocean slave trade. The frequent population movements, inflicted by periodical waves of migration and by the slave trade, contributed to very high ethnic diversities in the area.⁶⁹

Pre-colonial Congo was also characterised by a relatively low population density, among others due to its climatic conditions and slave trade, which meant that land pressure was not strong enough to induce the development of an elaborated customary land tenure system.⁷⁰ Colonial Belgian authorities, which took over the governance of the previously privately owned Congo Free State,⁷¹ codified customary land laws for land that was already controlled by traditional authorities. All other land was declared to be the property of the colonial state.⁷²

⁶⁸ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014, 39.

⁶⁹ GREEN, Elliott. "The Political Demography of Conflict in Modern Africa." *London School of Economics and Political Science, Development Studies Institute, Working Paper Series* No. 10-111. March 2010, 17-18 [accessed 10.2.2016]. Available from: <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/41250/1/WP111.pdf>.

⁷⁰ GREEN, Elliott. "The Political Demography of Conflict in Modern Africa," 18.

⁷¹ Encyclopædia Britannica. "Belgian Congo." *Encyclopædia Britannica Online* [accessed 20.3.2016]. Available from: <http://www.britannica.com/place/Belgian-Congo>.

⁷² VLASSENROOT, Koen, HUGGINS, Chris. "Land, Migration and Conflict in Eastern DRC." In HUGGINS, Chris, CLOVER, Jenny, eds. *From the Ground Up: Land Rights, Conflict and Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005, 126.

Epidemic, famine, and state-sanctioned violence under early Belgian rule caused the population of Congo Free State to plummet by 1905 to half of its pre-colonial size.⁷³ This adverse demographic development was reinforced by Belgian colonial authorities who overtook customary functions and expatriated vast portions of land.⁷⁴ As a result, the transition to colonial rule severely disrupted existing social and power structures, as well as population dynamics.

The mountainous Kivu provinces located in eastern Congo are in terms of their physical and human geography part of the Great Lakes highlands to their east.⁷⁵ Thanks to its favourable climate and their geology, the Great Lakes region has historically supported relatively high densities of people for Sub-Saharan African standards.⁷⁶ As the Kivus were somewhat less densely populated than neighbouring Rwanda,⁷⁷ however, they attracted numerous waves of migration, which was, in general, the traditional Sub-Saharan African response to overpopulations, soil exhaustion, or dissatisfaction with rulers in pre-colonial times.⁷⁸ This migratory trend was further encouraged by Belgian authorities after they acquired Rwanda from Germany in the aftermath of World War I.⁷⁹ They hoped to resolve the population and labour shortage in the Congo, caused by early colonial mismanagement, and at the same time to ease demographic pressure in Rwanda.⁸⁰

The Belgian-sponsored import of workers from Rwanda was directed mainly at North Kivu. It is estimated that around 85,000⁸¹ Banyarwanda (ethnic Rwandan; mostly Hutu but also many Tutsi) settled in the province during Belgian rule.⁸² Colonial plantation owners welcomed the newcoming labour force, unlike autochthon Congolese tribes who viewed them as foreigners even though there were numerous Kinyarwanda speakers living in the Kivus already in pre-colonial times. Ethnicity and land conflict between locals and migrants had

⁷³ MCCALPIN, Jermaine O. "Historicity of a Crisis: The Origins of the Congo War." In CLARK, John F., ed. *The African Stakes of the Congo War*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, 35.

⁷⁴ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2011, 330.

⁷⁵ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War: The 'Congolese' Conflict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa*. London: Hurst, 2009, 75-76.

⁷⁶ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 11.

⁷⁷ Rwanda's population was estimated to be 15 times denser in 1900 than the African average.

MCEVEDY, Colin, JONES, Richard. *Atlas of World Population History*. New York: Penguin, 1978.

⁷⁸ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 39.

⁷⁹ GREEN, Elliott. "The Political Demography of Conflict in Modern Africa," 18.

⁸⁰ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 72.

⁸¹ Some estimates run up to as high as 175,000.

STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 72.

⁸² PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 48.

become intimately linked early on, and Belgian attempts at creating a Banyarwanda chiefdom in North Kivu in 1936 proved futile in the face of local opposition.⁸³

The development in North Kivu clearly reflects the security impact of changing resource distribution between different ethnic groups, as theorised by Goldstone.⁸⁴ The significant immigration into the already populous North Kivu further increased demand for land and disrupted some of the traditional patterns of land ownership, leading to “sons of the soil conflicts” of limited intensity. While the intensity of skirmishes could possibly be mitigated by the presence of colonial authorities, another important factor is the apparent lack of strong political and elite mobilisation and coordination. Therefore, in the colonial era, tensions between the Banyarwanda migrants and autochthon tribes remained limited.

Immigration into South Kivu was less intense and more gradual. A small, mostly pastoralist Tutsi group of Banyarwanda migrants had been arriving to the area since possibly as early as the seventeenth century. Their migration was motivated mostly by the search for better pastures and by the flight from frequent infighting between different clans in densely populated Rwanda and Burundi. They settled in the remote highland pastures around the town of Mulenge to the south of Bukavu, from where they derive their name – Banyamulenge. Some low-intensity tension between the migrants and their autochthon neighbours soon emerged, as the cattle of the pastoralist Tutsi Banyamulenge trampled their neighbours’ fields. Further resentment was inflicted by the Belgian colonial authorities who refused to give the Banyamulenge the right to an own administrative entity, as they were afraid of alienating autochthon communities by doing so.⁸⁵ Nonetheless, ethnic tension was considerably lower than in North Kivu, for the relatively less populous South Kivu area with a comparatively low population growth rate did not experience such pressure on land as its northern neighbour. Ethnic tension increased considerably only in the second half of the twentieth century with a further influx caused by anti-Tutsi persecution in neighbouring Rwanda.⁸⁶

Although somewhat less densely populated than Rwanda, the Kivus were a site of high population density compared to other regions of the Congo.⁸⁷ This was due to high quality soil and milder high-altitude temperatures, which facilitated above average fertility rates and

⁸³ VLASSENROOT, Koen, HUGGINS, Chris. “Land, Migration and Conflict in Eastern DRC.”

⁸⁴ See page 10.

GOLDSTONE, Jack A. “A Theory of Political Demography: Human and Institutional Reproduction.” In GOLDSTONE, Jack A., KAUFMANN, Eric P., and DUFFY TOFT, Monica, eds. *Political Demography: How Population Changes Are Reshaping International Security and National Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 24.

⁸⁵ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 58-61.

⁸⁶ RUHIMBIKA, Müller. *Les Banyamulenge du Congo-Zaïre entre deux guerres*. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001.

⁸⁷ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 48.

drew internal and Rwandan migrants.⁸⁸ By the 1950s, however, population growth rates stabilised in the Kivus while fertility rates sharply increased in other parts of the Congo. Population growth across the country reached over 3.0 percent per year and it brought with itself increased urbanisation and the clearing of lands for agriculture in rural areas.⁸⁹ This phenomenon is most probably attributable to the fact, that in the 1950s, for the first time in the Belgian colonial era, the previously hardly existing social infrastructure of hospitals, schools, and roads expanded considerably. The 1950s were the only colonial decade when real wages rose substantially. There was some limited support for the creation of educated local elites and opening new opportunities for them.⁹⁰ The changing conditions not only enabled growth in fertility rates, they also increased expectations. These growing expectations were, however, doomed to not be fulfilled in the paternalistic system of economic exploitation and low levels of native human development, which the Congo inherited from its colonial rulers.⁹¹ As Goldstone's theory anticipates,⁹² these unmet expectations were to play an important role in post-independence social upheavals.

2.2. *Post-independence*

Joining the general tide of decolonization in Africa, Belgium organized hasty elections in the Congo in 1960 which were followed by handing over government to a Congolese people completely unprepared for the task of managing the vast state.⁹³ Prior to independence, the Belgian administration did virtually nothing to create political and social conditions which would be conducive to a smooth transfer of power. During the colonial era, primary education expanded significantly, fostering demands for independence. On the other hand, an indigenous university-educated elite, which could have formed the leadership managing those expectations, was practically non-existent.^{94 95}

⁸⁸ GREEN, Elliott. "The Political Demography of Conflict in Modern Africa," 18.

⁸⁹ ROMANIUK, Anatole. "Increase in Natural Fertility during the Early Stages of Modernization: Evidence from an African Case Study, Zaire." *Population Studies*. Vol. 34, No. 2 (1980): 293–310.

⁹⁰ YOUNG, Crawford. "Contextualizing Congo Conflicts: Order and Disorder in Postcolonial Africa." In CLARK, John F., ed. *The African Stakes of the Congo War*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, 14.

⁹¹ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 76.

⁹² See page 10.

GOLDSTONE, Jack A. "A Theory of Political Demography," 22.

⁹³ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 330.

⁹⁴ CLAPHAM, Christopher. *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 38.

⁹⁵ There were only *seventeen* university graduates at the time of independence in 1960 out of a population of twenty million.

PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 76.

Correspondingly, immediately after gaining independence, the Congo⁹⁶ plunged into five years of political chaos with the infighting of tribal coalitions in the background, as well as the secessions of the mineral-rich provinces of Katanga and South Kasai. The civil war following the state collapse at independence was brought to an end largely by the 1965 CIA-sponsored military coup of Joseph-Désiré Mobutu,⁹⁷ who shortly after declared himself president and established single party rule.⁹⁸

Independence, owing partially to its Western sponsors, opened access to new sources of development assistance for the Congo. The economic growth of the 1950s was thus followed not only by enthusiasm over the new independent statehood, but also by further economic gains.⁹⁹ As the new state stood initially on relatively sound fiscal grounds, it faced no serious international threats, and was supported by its elites, popular discontent and violent civil conflicts were, in accordance with Goldstone's second hypothesis,¹⁰⁰ rather infrequent in the early years of Mobutu's rule.¹⁰¹

The 1970s, however, saw the beginning of two decades of steady economic decline.¹⁰² As a result of the renewal of ethnic-based access to the state and its resources, the economy of Zaire¹⁰³ plummeted, while the overall consequences of the Mobutu era mismanagement were to be even more graver in the years to come. One of the indicators of the state's decay was the declining army, which was poorly paid, if at all, and decentralized in an attempt to let it accumulate its own revenue.¹⁰⁴

After the end of the Cold War, financial aid and support for Zaire from its Western backers was drastically cut, accelerating its economic collapse.¹⁰⁵ With the changing international situation, the excesses of the Zairean regime, such as the violent oppression of opposition or financial mismanagement, were not tolerated any more by international donors. The cutting of aid lead to hyperinflation, ever more looting by the unpaid army, and chaotic

⁹⁶ Officially known as the Republic of the Congo, referred to mostly as Congo- Leopoldville in order to distinguish from Congo-Brazzaville which had an identical official name at the time.
CIA: The World Factbook. "Africa: Congo, Democratic Republic of the." 25.2.2016 [accessed 22.3.2016]
Available from: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html>.

⁹⁷ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 76.

⁹⁸ MCCALPIN, Jermaine O. "Historicity of a Crisis," 40.

⁹⁹ YOUNG, Crawford. "Contextualizing Congo Conflicts," 24.

¹⁰⁰ See page 11.

GOLDSTONE, Jack A. "Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent Conflict." *Journal of International Affairs*. Vol. 56, No. 1 (2002): 8.

¹⁰¹ YOUNG, Crawford. "Contextualizing Congo Conflicts," 16.

¹⁰² YOUNG, Crawford. "Contextualizing Congo Conflicts," 24.

¹⁰³ Mobutu changed the Congo's name to Zaire in 1971.

CIA: The World Factbook. "Africa: Congo, Democratic Republic of the."

¹⁰⁴ MCCALPIN, Jermaine O. "Historicity of a Crisis," 42-45.

¹⁰⁵ GREEN, Elliott. "The Political Demography of Conflict in Modern Africa," 19.

provinces with contending ethnic units.¹⁰⁶ In this situation, the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the subsequent exodus of refugees could, as a matter of course, not be treated adequately.

2.2.1. Kivu provinces

As has been already outlined above, North and South Kivu were provinces with high population density and ethnic fragmentation, where the issue of access to land had created considerable security problems in the past. The already precarious balance of ethnic groups and land ownership was, especially in North Kivu, further disturbed by the flight of tens of thousands of mainly Rwandan Tutsi into the province in the early 1960s. The cause of this massive exile was the ongoing civil war in Rwanda, which resulted in the exclusion of Tutsi from political life.¹⁰⁷ It was the first truly major wave of Rwandan refugees fleeing their homeland, sowing the seeds of future instability.¹⁰⁸

Existing tensions between autochthons and Banyarwanda over property rights and perceptions of land ownership were further intensified by the massive influx of Rwandan Tutsi between 1959 and 1964.¹⁰⁹ The outgoing Belgian administration favoured the newcomers, as due to having lived in more densely populated areas, they often had higher levels of human capital development.¹¹⁰ Similarly to the previous waves of Banyarwanda migrants, the Belgians facilitated the growth of the new arrivals to economic elites.¹¹¹ As a result, the proportions of the relative size of native and settler groups, as well as of the power and resource distribution between them, swiftly altered. The new influx of Banyarwanda, who joined their ethnic fellows already living in North Kivu, challenged the dominance of autochthon groups. According to Goldstone's third hypothesis,¹¹² such change to the ethnic balance of an area is strongly associated with political instability and constitutes a risk factor for violent conflict. Moreover, as asserted by Green,¹¹³ the fact that the locals and migrants came from different ethnic groups, provided for more effective mobilisation and collective action.

¹⁰⁶ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 78-79.

¹⁰⁷ REYNTJENS, Filip. *The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 2.

¹⁰⁸ MURISON, Jude. "The Politics of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in the Congo War." In CLARK, John F., ed. *The African Stakes of the Congo War*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, 226.

¹⁰⁹ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 49.

¹¹⁰ GREEN, Elliott. "The Political Demography of Conflict in Modern Africa," 12.

¹¹¹ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 72.

¹¹² See page 11.

GOLDSTONE, Jack A. "Population and Security," 4-5.

¹¹³ See page 13.

GREEN, Elliott. "The Political Demography of Conflict in Modern Africa," 13.

Growing tension between the natives and settlers, as well as threats of expulsion of the Banyarwanda from North Kivu, on the pretence of provoking ethnic discord, led to the eruption of the so-called Kanyarwanda rebellion in 1964.¹¹⁴ The revolt was further exacerbated by the unrestrained social anger of marginalized youth who filled the ranks of the contending camps. In line with Urdal's motive and opportunity reasoning,¹¹⁵ conflict constituted for these youths a way of fuelling their frustration over economic grievances, as well as of acquiring some possessions by force. Simultaneously, the abundant supply of rebel labour due to economic hardship lowered the costs of recruitment, further increasing the risk of armed conflict.¹¹⁶ This limited outburst of violence did not last long, however, and died down with the suspension of the law calling for the expulsion of immigrants in 1965.¹¹⁷

In the early years of Mobutu's rule, the economically already more forward Banyarwanda gained political influence as well. As in the Kivus they could not get a broader local power base independent from the central government, the Banyarwanda were a potentially trustworthy ally for Mobutu in a province which sided with his political rivals in the chaotic years following independence. Banyarwanda enjoyed preferential treatment in political promotions, as well as in access to land ownership, leaving the whole community, even those who did not benefit, stigmatized.¹¹⁸

With the adoption of the 1973 land law, which abolished customary land and declared land the property of the state,¹¹⁹ the inequalities in land ownership further increased.¹²⁰ Taking advantage of their close relationship with the Mobutu regime, the Banyarwanda ensured that the new law would allow them to purchase former colonial plantations and allocate themselves land.¹²¹ By the early 1980s, strong resentment developed in North Kivu against the "intruders" who were in possession of ancestral land,¹²² which is a telling example of the increasing perception of immigrants as foreigners in the post-colonial period, as asserted by

¹¹⁴ REYNTJENS, Filip. *The Great African War*, 13.

¹¹⁵ See page 14-15.

URDAL, Henrik. "A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence." *International Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 50 (2006): 609-610.

¹¹⁶ YOUNG, Crawford. "Contextualizing Congo Conflicts," 20.

¹¹⁷ GERARD-LIBOIS, Jules, VERHAEGEN, Benoit. *Congo 1965: Political Documents of a Developing Nation*. Princeton University Press, 1967, 79.

¹¹⁸ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 49-50.

¹¹⁹ GREEN, Elliott. "The Political Demography of Conflict in Modern Africa," 18.

¹²⁰ GREEN, Elliott. "The Political Demography of Conflict in Modern Africa," 19.

¹²¹ POTTIER, Johan. "Roadblock Ethnography: Negotiating Humanitarian Access in Ituri, Eastern DR Congo, 1999-2004." *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*. Vol. 76, No. 2 (2006): 151-179.

¹²² MACGAFFEY, Wyatt. "The Policy of National Integration in Zaire." *Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 20, No. 1 (1982): 102-103.

Herbst.¹²³ Their quick economic and political ascendance created durable anti-Banyarwanda feelings in north Kivu,¹²⁴ which helps explain the virulent backlash against them in subsequent years.

Mobutu's politics of "divide and rule" with respect to the many ethnic communities of the Congo had to turn against the Banyarwanda as well, sooner or later. In 1981, political winds changed and Mobutu reversed his earlier 1971 citizenship law granting blanket rights to all Rwandans and Burundians who had been in the Congo since 1960. All immigrants had to apply under the new law for citizenship, and prove Congolese ancestry back to 1885. Congolese citizenship also became a prerequisite for owning large property, including land.¹²⁵ Most early-1960s Tutsi migrants, and many Banyarwanda altogether, were refused citizenship, losing access to politics, large property, the judiciary, or the police forces.¹²⁶ This new shift of the political power balance generated huge social tensions.¹²⁷ The insecure status of Kinyarwanda speakers in the Kivus, as well as the importance of political manipulation with citizenship and of the perception of foreigners, became evident, and helped to create the conditions for future clashes.¹²⁸

Unease between the Banyarwanda and other Congolese tribes was steadily mounting in the lead-up to the 1993 elections.¹²⁹ Non-Banyarwanda politicians were reminding the members of their respective ethnic groups of past land expropriations by the "Rwandan immigrants,"¹³⁰ leading to mob attacks and localized infighting between the "natives" and the Banyarwanda.¹³¹ The decades-long struggle for land had thus once again burst into interethnic conflict, with attacks mounting up until early 1994 when Mobutu facilitated an uneasy ceasefire. It did not last long, however, and was shattered only a few months later by the exodus of 850,000 Hutu refugees in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide.¹³²

With relation to the genocide, which can be seen as a culmination of decades-long hostilities between Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi, a somewhat parallel trend was unfolding in North Kivu in the early 1990s. With the outbreak of an armed insurgency in northern Rwanda

¹²³ See page 18.

HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 228.

¹²⁴ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 172.

¹²⁵ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 73.

¹²⁶ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 50.

¹²⁷ MURISON, Jude. "The Politics of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in the Congo War," 227.

¹²⁸ REYNTJENS, Filip. *The Great African War*, 2.

¹²⁹ With the West unwilling to further tolerate Mobutu's authoritarian rule in exchange for his loyalty after the end of the Cold War, and with international financial aid drying up, Mobutu was forced by circumstances to allow multiparty elections in 1993.

¹³⁰ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 73.

¹³¹ MURISON, Jude. "The Politics of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in the Congo War," 227.

¹³² PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 50-51.

in 1990, relations between Congolese Hutu and Tutsi started to sour as well, gradually dividing the Banyarwanda community of North Kivu.¹³³ Banyarwanda youth was especially affected, as Congolese Hutu and Tutsi were recruited by different sides of the Rwandan conflict.¹³⁴

In South Kivu, relations between the Banyamulenge and local tribes were aggravated mostly by the civil war following independence in the early 1960s. Lumumbist¹³⁵ rebels were preying on the Banyamulenge's cattle during the civil war, which resulted in their turning against the rebels and accepting weapons from Mobutu. As many rebels came from neighbouring autochthon tribes, resentment was created between the two groups.¹³⁶ Tensions were further exacerbated by the new arrival of Tutsi as a result of the civil war in Rwanda in the early 1960s, and the ensuing hunger for expanded pastures and land rights. Combined, existing economic grievances and the increasing competition over resources and land in response to the new migratory wave, resulted in the outbreak of major violence in 1965.¹³⁷

Low-intensity tension had been continuously present since the bloody events of 1965. In the favourable political climate of Mobutu's early rule, the Banyamulenge expanded territorially, but still remained politically and population-wise marginal and relatively poor. While their neighbours tried to downplay their numbers, they themselves exaggerated them. In reality, they comprised around 60,000 to 80,000 people, representing only three to four percent of South Kivu's population of about 2.4 million. In comparison, Banyarwanda in North Kivu constituted around forty percent of a population of about 2.8 million.¹³⁸

With the above mentioned 1981 citizenship law, the "dubious citizenship" of Banyamulenge became another daunting issue for the community. In a 1989 census, most Banyamulenge were refused citizenship.¹³⁹ In the early 1990s, Banyamulenge youths were widely recruited to join the Rwandan Tutsi rebellion aiming at overthrowing the existing Hutu regime in Kigali. The major motives for joining were similar to those outlined in the case of North Kivu – greed, opportunism, and economic frustration; but also grievances over

¹³³ MURISON, Jude. "The Politics of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in the Congo War," 227.

¹³⁴ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 50.

¹³⁵ Patrice Lumumba played an important role in Congolese independence and served as the Congo's first Prime Minister. He called for national unity, wanted to re-integrate the secessionist Katanga province and to expel Belgian forces. He was dismissed from office, however, and assassinated shortly thereafter in 1961.

CORDELL, Dennis D. "Patrice Lumumba." *Encyclopædia Britannica Online* [accessed 25.3.2016]. Available from: <http://www.britannica.com/biography/Patrice-Lumumba>.

¹³⁶ RUHIMBIKA, Müller. *Les Banyamulenge du Congo-Zaïre entre deux guerres*.

¹³⁷ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 61.

¹³⁸ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 52-53.

¹³⁹ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 65.

citizenship and identity issues, as well as the daunting memories of the 1965 massacres.¹⁴⁰ Nonetheless, the Banyamulenge's woes in the Kivus may have gone unaddressed for many more years, had it not been for the development in Zaire's tiny neighbours to the east.

2.3. Rwandan genocide

The aim of political demography is to explore the political and security impacts of demographic change. One of the most drastic changes in population in modern history, in terms of both its size and structure, occurred in 1994 in the small east African country of Rwanda. Its political and security implications were massive, reaching far beyond the country's borders and destabilising the entire region. Therefore, before proceeding with the demographic-security analysis of the Kivus, I first look at the dynamics of the Rwandan genocide.

Historically, Rwanda was much more densely populated than other areas of Sub-Saharan Africa. According to estimates, it was some fifteen times denser in 1900 than the African average.¹⁴¹ Today, it has still one of the highest population densities in the world, and the highest in continental Africa.¹⁴²

The mentioned demographic characteristics had a number of crucial consequences for political and security dynamics in Rwanda already in the pre-colonial period, which in turn played a major role later in the inception of the genocide. Due to increased pressure to use agricultural land productively, a highly intricate property rights system over land developed in pre-colonial Rwanda. As surrounding areas were considerably less populous, land scarcity often drove those on the periphery to migrate to adjacent regions. Hutu and Tutsi had therefore gradually expanded to neighbouring countries as well.¹⁴³ High population density had ramifications for the development of Rwanda's ethnic structure too – unlike other African ethnic groups, Hutu and Tutsi “speak the same language (Kinyarwanda); they belong to the same clans; they live in the same regions and, in most areas, the same neighborhoods; they have the same cultural practices and myths; and they have the same religions.”¹⁴⁴ The major difference between them is that Hutu are farmers while Tutsi are mainly pastoralist. The two

¹⁴⁰ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 52.

¹⁴¹ MCEVEDY, Colin, JONES, Richard. *Atlas of World Population History*.

¹⁴² “Population density (people per sq. km of land area).” *The World Bank* [accessed 25.3.2016] Available from: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST?order=wbapi_data_value_2014+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc.

¹⁴³ GREEN, Elliott. “The Political Demography of Conflict in Modern Africa,” 21.

¹⁴⁴ STRAUS, Scott. *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006, 19-20.

groups appear to be “more like castes than ethnic groups, [...] Hutus who acquired cattle could thus become Tutsis.”¹⁴⁵

During the Belgian colonial era, Tutsi were favoured over Hutu as a superior race, effectively closing or at least limiting options for social mobility which until then existed between the two groups.¹⁴⁶ Belgian preference created political inequality and durable resentment between the two groups, which boiled over as soon as Belgian colonial power started to crumble. Independence in 1962 was accompanied in Rwanda by anti-Tutsi pogroms, in the wake of which a Hutu elite took power and over 300,000 Tutsi fled not only to the neighbouring Kivus as was already described, but also into Burundi and Uganda.¹⁴⁷ Thousands of young Tutsi grew up as second-class citizens in refugee camps, stirring in them tensions and ambitions to regain power.¹⁴⁸

In Uganda the more than 200,000 Tutsi settled in the country's south soon became involved in violent disputes over land, in what could be termed a “sons of the soil conflict”. Ugandan youth gangs often harassed the immigrants, and accused them of taking their land. Consequently, many young Tutsi joined the Ugandan rebel leader Yoweri Museveni's uprising in the late 1970s.¹⁴⁹ In 1979, the revolt succeeded in overthrowing Idi Amin, the incumbent authoritarian president of the country. A new model of regime displacement was forged in the rebellion – one involving a polyglot force of Ugandan exiles and Rwandan Tutsi refugees, who forcefully overthrew the existing government from the outside and from the periphery.¹⁵⁰ Thanks to their participation in the guerrilla fights, the Rwandan refugees had a strong and influential presence in the new Museveni regime. Native Ugandans, however, did not welcome this development. The dragging land conflicts in the country's south hindered the refugees' prospects for citizenship or advance in Museveni's forces. As not even fighting in the rebellion could ensure the Rwandan refugees and their children born in Uganda the right to resettle and the recognition of their Ugandan identity, the refugees increasingly turned towards the prospect of forcefully returning to Rwanda.¹⁵¹ With Museveni's backing, including the provision of supplies, training, and a rear base for operation, the refugees reorganised in exile forming the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).¹⁵² This moment of

¹⁴⁵ GREEN, Elliott. “The Political Demography of Conflict in Modern Africa,” 22.

¹⁴⁶ GREEN, Elliott. “The Political Demography of Conflict in Modern Africa,” 22.

¹⁴⁷ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 17.

¹⁴⁸ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 237.

¹⁴⁹ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 237.

¹⁵⁰ YOUNG, Crawford. “Contextualizing Congo Conflicts,” 25.

¹⁵¹ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 330.

¹⁵² DUNN, Kevin C. “A Survival Guide to Kinshasa: Lessons of the Father, Passed Down to the Son.” In CLARK, John F., ed. *The African Stakes of the Congo War*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, 57.

organisation was crucial for the future actions and success of the exiled Tutsi in Uganda, as an established leadership enabled more effective mobilisation and collective action in the name of a common cause. In October 1990, the RPF launched a “reform insurgency”, using Clapham’s terminology, seeking to transform the governing structures of their home country.¹⁵³ As the uprising was launched from Ugandan territory, it initially affected mostly northern Rwanda.¹⁵⁴

According to several authors, such as Prunier (2009), or Straus (2006), the 1990 Tutsi invasion of Rwanda was the single most important factor precipitating the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The assault of the Ugandan diaspora radicalized Rwandan Hutu and legitimized violence against the “interior” Tutsi, who were seen by the Hutu extremist factions of the Kigali government as ready to side with the invaders. The fear of becoming, similarly to the colonial era, subordinated to Tutsi, and the ensuing uncertainty also led many moderate Hutu to kill.¹⁵⁵ This feeling of insecurity was reinforced in Rwandan Hutu by the tide of displaced persons coming to Kigali from the north and spreading word of atrocities committed by the RPF. Hutu extremists took advantage of the spreading paranoia and exploited it in their inciting broadcasts. Another important factor enflaming violence against the Tutsi was the presence of Burundian Hutu refugees in Kigali who had fled to Rwanda to escape violence by the Tutsi regime in their own country.¹⁵⁶ Multiple population movements and the ensuing shifting perception of the other, exacerbated by its exploitation by political leaders, were thus clearly crucial in creating the preconditions and climate for violence of unseen proportions.

A number of other demographic factors played an equally important role in creating conditions for the very feasibility of the execution of the genocide. The already described centuries-long high population density in Rwanda facilitated the creation of a complex and coordinated state bureaucracy, which acquired a capacity to deal effectively with enemies, including committing violence on them. Further, it also limited exit or escape options at the disposal of those assaulted.¹⁵⁷ Finally, it led many to migrate to neighbouring countries where they were able to form significant enough diaspora to launch an invasion into the home

¹⁵³ CLAPHAM, Christopher. *Africa and the International System*, 211.

¹⁵⁴ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 13.

¹⁵⁵ STRAUS, Scott. *The Order of Genocide*, 226.

¹⁵⁶ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 24.

¹⁵⁷ STRAUS, Scott. *The Order of Genocide*, 215.

country.¹⁵⁸ All these factors played out in the Rwandan genocide, enabling the killing of more than 500,000¹⁵⁹ Tutsi and thousands of Hutu moderates between April and July 1994.¹⁶⁰

With respect to the execution of the genocide, geopolitical factors were crucial as well. Given Rwanda's small size, the central government could exercise, for African standards, unusually strong authority over its population.¹⁶¹ The country's small and densely populated territory with exceptionally high road density, compared to the African average,¹⁶² undoubtedly largely contributed to the volume and speed of the killings, as it restricted escape options.¹⁶³

The socio-demographic situation after the genocide was extremely complex. In the south of Rwanda, around 500,000 people had settled in IDP camps within the safe zone established by the French as a part of Operation Turquoise. There were roughly 500,000 other IDPs countrywide, while approximately 3.6 million people were living in settled conditions. Over 700,000 Tutsi were meanwhile returning from the diaspora, and were taking over unoccupied houses and farms, assuming that all who had fled were *génocidaires*. The returnees, while in their numbers comparable to those who were killed or had fled, were sociologically quite different from them. Living in exile, in situations where access to land was restricted, they had mostly no experience with agriculture and usually had an urban background. Most of those killed, however, were rural dwellers, which led to fierce competition for urban properties. There was a general lack of housing, as with approximately 150,000 houses destroyed, even illegal occupations were not enough to appease the demand. The returnees also quickly monopolized wage earning jobs, pushing the Hutu out of the towns and furthering social tensions. The number of unaccompanied minors reached drastic proportions as well – roughly 300,000 children were left without parents or guardians. Most of the police forces, judges, teachers, and doctors were dead or had fled.¹⁶⁴ The new authorities, on not only the national, but also the local level, were thus mostly Tutsi coming

¹⁵⁸ STRAUS, Scott. *The Order of Genocide*, 226.

¹⁵⁹ It is problematic to establish a precise estimate, as the number of Tutsi may have been underreported in population censuses mandated by the Hutu regime, in order to downplay the significance of Tutsi in the population. Given these difficulties, some estimates reach figures as high as one million victims overall in the country.

¹⁶⁰ DES FORGES, Alison. *"LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY": Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, 15.

¹⁶¹ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 155.

¹⁶² In 1997, Rwanda had a road density (measured as kilometres of roads divided by square kilometres of land) of 0.56 compared to the African average of 0.11 and median of 0.07. International Road Federation Union. *World Road Statistics 1993–97*. Geneva: International Road Federation Union, 1999, 10-15.

¹⁶³ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 169.

¹⁶⁴ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 5-6.

back from exile, who have spent the last thirty years outside the country.¹⁶⁵ To sum up, within an extremely short period of time, the ethnic balance and power distribution within Rwanda changed enormously. Deriving from Goldstone's assumptions,¹⁶⁶ after such dramatic alteration of the structure of the population and of relative power positions, the eruption of conflict was almost inevitable.

The returnees to Rwanda started to form "tribes of exile" shortly after their arrival, the most important of which were the Ugandans. The returnees generally mistrusted fellow Tutsi who survived the genocide and suspected them of collaboration with the *génocidaires* in order to save their lives. Hutu survivors were as a rule assumed to be complicit in the genocide.¹⁶⁷ With the judiciary system in ruins, arbitrary detentions and murders, as well as illegal property seizures were becoming the order of the day, leading to allegations of a "double genocide" being executed, this time by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA; the armed branch of RPF) against the Hutu.¹⁶⁸ While the perpetrators of the gravest crimes during the genocide remained at large,¹⁶⁹ mostly in Zaire and occasionally in Tanzania, the threat of jail was ever present for the remainder of the Hutu community.¹⁷⁰

Such development in relations was enabled by three main factors. The first was the peculiar culture developed by the RPF during the Ugandan civil war of the 1980s, which had been a formative experience for many of its members. The hard core of the RPF grew up during that war, experienced anti-Rwandan pogroms and endured, witnessed or engaged in civilian massacres – "[f]or them violence was not exceptional; it was a normal state of affairs."¹⁷¹

One of the prime examples of post-genocide excess violence by the RPF is the forceful closure of the Kibeho camp for internally displaced persons (IDP) in the south of Rwanda. The former Safe Humanitarian Zone created by the French Operation Turquoise in southwestern Rwanda hosted a number of large IDP camps up until a year after the genocide. Their population of about 350,000 refused to return to the insecurity of the hills, as rumours of RPF atrocities had spread. The new government, however, insisted on closing the camps, which were deemed to be hiding some of the perpetrators of the genocide. Kibeho camp was

¹⁶⁵ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 19.

¹⁶⁶ See page 10.

GOLDSTONE, Jack A. "A Theory of Political Demography," 24.

¹⁶⁷ MOUTOT, Anne. "Au Rwanda, la diaspora tutsie contre les rescapés." *Libération*. 28.11.1995.

¹⁶⁸ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 9.

¹⁶⁹ MISSER, François. "Searching for the Killers." *New African*. April 1995.

¹⁷⁰ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 11-12.

¹⁷¹ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 13.

forcefully closed by RPF troops days after the first anniversary of the genocide.¹⁷² Rwandan soldiers opened fire at amassed IDPs, probably causing over 5000 casualties (official sources cite approximately 300 killed, who were involved in criminal and anti-repatriation activities inside the camp and constituted a *génocidaire* hard core). The rest of the IDPs were forcefully repatriated but many perished in the process.¹⁷³ This pattern of amassed refugees generating a perception of threat (and indeed constituting a security risk), followed by a harsh response from the Rwandan regime, is notable, as it was to be repeated in the case of the Kivus.

The second important aspect explaining post-genocide aggression in Rwanda was its changed population structure. During the insurgency in northern Rwanda and shortly after the genocide, assaults against Hutu were carried out mostly by the RPA and were largely systematic. In later stages, however, the regime seems to have rather tolerated than instigated murders. Political assassinations happened almost automatically in the tight economic situation, as the returnees' need for jobs in the monetarized sector could easily be satisfied by alleging that certain power holders had *génocidaire* background. No important perpetrators were ever brought to justice in cases concerning the killings of businessmen or public servants.¹⁷⁴ The change of the population structure thus clearly precipitated political violence.

Finally, the third factor was the new power balance which allowed the RPF to act with impunity, locally as well as internationally. In the aftermath of the genocide, no prominent Hutu *génocidaires* had been executed. "[A]ll Hutu were [thus] regarded as potential killers [a]nd all Tutsi had become licensed avengers."¹⁷⁵ The general perception was that with the Tutsi having had lost approximately three quarters¹⁷⁶ of their population, the situation could not be settled without some bloodshed on the other side as well.¹⁷⁷ The ensuing culture of impunity on the one hand, and frustration on the other hand, were further roused by the incapacity of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to quickly bring the main perpetrators to justice.¹⁷⁸

Internationally, the RPF's ingenious use of communication and information towards the West put it into the position of the "victim" "restoring order," after the international community had failed to keep it. Kigali's discourse exploited the outside world's guilt

¹⁷² KENT, Randolph. "The Integrated Operations Centre in Rwanda: Coping with Complexity." In WITMAN, Jim, PECOCK, David, eds. *After Rwanda: The Coordination of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance*. London: Macmillan, 1996, 64-66.

¹⁷³ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 41.

¹⁷⁴ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 21-22.

¹⁷⁵ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 35.

¹⁷⁶ DES FORGES, Alison. "LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY", 15.

¹⁷⁷ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 18.

¹⁷⁸ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 35.

masterfully. It utilised various communication techniques, for instance altering the tone of speeches in English and Kinyarwanda to maximize the effect on the respective audience.¹⁷⁹ The RPF chief and future Rwandan president Paul Kagame himself boasted to a British journalist: “We used communication and information warfare better than anyone. We have found a new way of doing things.”¹⁸⁰ The effectiveness of the Kigali regime’s discourse in advancing their political goals thus highlights the role of perception and elite manipulation in ethnic conflict.

Within Rwanda, the new government explored the limits of international toleration for ruling through the force of arms, and realised there were hardly any.¹⁸¹ With the exodus of more than a million Rwandan Hutu refugees into neighbouring Zaire, the Rwandan regime’s main area of interest and action crossed the borders as well. The limited east African strife between Hutu and Tutsi could thus explode into continental relevance.

2.4. *Post-genocide Congo*

An event of such magnitude as the Rwandan genocide could understandably hardly be kept bottled up within the Rwandan state’s territory. With the rapid influx of Rwandan refugees following the genocide, instability quickly boiled over to the neighbouring Congo where it helped to create conditions for a new cataclysm, this time with implications for virtually the whole continent.¹⁸² More than 1.2 million people entered the Congo in the space of four days in July 1994, drastically affecting the country’s eastern region.¹⁸³

To clarify, the Rwandan genocide and the ensuing exodus of refugees did not directly cause the implosion of the Congo Basin and its periphery. It rather served as a trigger, changing population, and subsequently political and security dynamics, and precipitating a conflict that had been latent for many years.¹⁸⁴ The changing power balance between particular groups further exacerbated ethnic tensions which had been running high for decades.

The economic situation of eastern Congo was also strongly affected by the influx of refugees, and it, too, contributed to the mounting of destabilising ethnic tensions. The Congo

¹⁷⁹ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 22.

¹⁸⁰ GOWING, Nik. “Dispatches from Disaster Zones: The Reporting of Humanitarian Emergencies.” ECHO Conference Paper. London, 27-28 May 1998, 4 [accessed 28.3.2016] Available from: http://www.highlandsforum.org/briefs/1999_03/docs/gowing.pdf.

¹⁸¹ REYNTJENS, Filip. *The Great African War*, 4.

¹⁸² STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 13.

¹⁸³ MURISON, Jude. “The Politics of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in the Congo War,” 225-227.

¹⁸⁴ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, xxxi.

has seen little industrial progress, if any in some regions, since the days of independence. Still, every year “more and more young Africans [had been] trying to make a living out of a stagnant traditional agriculture and in a very slowly expanding urban job market.”¹⁸⁵ Under such circumstances, the violent tearing of an already weak social fabric of eastern Congo, instantiated by the massive refugee influx, was bound to have vast and unforeseeable consequences.¹⁸⁶ With the arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees in a few days, prices (especially of food) went skyrocketing in the east of the country. On the other hand, weapon and ammunition prices plummeted due to a general abundance – fleeing soldiers handed them over to Mobutu’s presidential guard then bought them back for small change.¹⁸⁷

For humanitarian organisations, as well as for the food supply in general, it was extremely difficult to keep up with the number of refugees and internally displaced who were in need of assistance. Insufficient basic goods, such as food and medical supplies, resulted in a huge amount of casualties in the camps.¹⁸⁸ At the same time, the lack of economic opportunities and the inability to satisfy basic needs, served for many especially young men as an incentive for joining rebel groups.

The consequences of the refugee influx were not limited to eastern Congo. The region, with its own inherent ethnic, political, and economic complexities, was at the same time at the heart of a fragile continent, where a localised upheaval could and would easily turn into a continental affair.¹⁸⁹ As Western support for the predatory Zairean regime had been waning after the end of the Cold War, surrounding young and energetic regimes could all move in the Congo Basin in the aftermath of the genocide, bringing former unresolved conflicts with them.¹⁹⁰

The 1994 predominantly Hutu Rwandan refugees were not the only ones who poured into eastern Congo in the 1990s. Especially in 1993, but also before, masses fled to the area also from Burundi.¹⁹¹ Similarly to Rwanda, the population of Burundi is made up of a Hutu majority and a Tutsi minority. In Burundi, however, the ruling minority had been leading pogroms against the Hutu,¹⁹² resulting in attempts by Hutu guerrilla groups at overthrowing

¹⁸⁵ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, xxxiii.

¹⁸⁶ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, xxxiv.

¹⁸⁷ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 25.

¹⁸⁸ MURISON, Jude. “The Politics of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in the Congo War,” 231-232.

¹⁸⁹ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 24.

¹⁹⁰ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 331.

¹⁹¹ MURISON, Jude. “The Politics of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in the Congo War,” 226.

¹⁹² STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 66.

the Tutsi-dominated Burundi government.¹⁹³ Fight for power on the high political level was accompanied by a fight for patronage in a state-dominated economy on the level of ordinary citizens. Rampant poverty ensured a steady supply of desperate followers for different representatives of the political class.¹⁹⁴ According to the former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, however, similarly to Rwanda, “the real problem [was] the pushing of space.”¹⁹⁵ Whereas in pre-colonial and even colonial times populations could react to land pressure and political oppression by moving away to a less populous area, with the newly acquired salience of boundaries and citizenship in the post-independence era this option became extremely restricted.¹⁹⁶ It became increasingly difficult to accommodate the expectations of growing populations for space and resources, leading the way, as in Goldstone’s model,¹⁹⁷ to social turmoil.

The assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu Burundian president, shortly after his inauguration in October 1993, led to an even more intense upheaval which resulted in thousands of Hutu fleeing into neighbouring Zaire.¹⁹⁸ Many of them settled in refugee camps in the Kivus, where they were joined less than a year later by another one and half million Hutu refugees from Rwanda.

The enormous flow of refugees into eastern Congo was highly destabilising for two main reasons. Firstly, it prompted competition between locals and refugees for resources. With the influx of substantial international aid, tensions further rose.¹⁹⁹ Secondly, apart from the fact that the Rwandan refugee exodus was one of the largest population movements of modern times, the structure of the fleeing masses served as a predisposition for destabilisation as well. The roughly one and half million Hutu civilians were accompanied by approximately 30,000 to 40,000 soldiers from the former Rwandan army (ex-FAR) and tens of thousands of militiamen, mainly from the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi youth militia.²⁰⁰

The massive refugee camps hosting Rwandan Hutu started to be set up in July 1994 and stayed for over two years. They were located almost directly on the border with Rwanda, signalling a general post-independence tendency in Africa to avoid the integration of refugees

¹⁹³ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 59.

¹⁹⁴ NDARISHIKANYE, Barnabé. “Quand deux clientélismes s’affrontent.” *Komera*. No. 3. March-April 1994.

¹⁹⁵ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 65.

¹⁹⁶ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 227.

¹⁹⁷ See page 10.

GOLDSTONE, Jack A. “A Theory of Political Demography,” 22.

¹⁹⁸ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 66.

¹⁹⁹ MURISON, Jude. “The Politics of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in the Congo War,” 226.

²⁰⁰ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 25.

into their host countries' societies.²⁰¹ Some of the biggest refugee camps had at times more than 400,000 inhabitants, being the largest of their kind in the world.²⁰² In Zaire, there was a total of about thirty-five camps with the five largest inhabiting some 850,000 people concentrated around Goma, the administrative capital of North Kivu. The rest of the camps was located to the south of Lake Kivu and held around 650,000 refugees. Another 270,000 Rwandans found refuge in nine camps in Burundi; and 570,000 in eight camps in Tanzania.²⁰³

The political and military class fled almost entirely to Zaire, taking with them substantive amounts of weaponry, as well as virtually the entire Rwandan state treasury. Several reports exist which allege that fleeing former government and army representatives shepherded masses into refuge,²⁰⁴ expecting that the massive population they controlled would provide an immediate human buffer and a future political pawn or blackmailing force in case of negotiations with the Tutsi regime in Rwanda.²⁰⁵ Refugees were then forbidden from returning to Rwanda, reinforcing the impression that Rwandan Hutu elites engaged in premeditated demographic engineering. The limited returnee flow back to Rwanda was stopped altogether by 1995, owing to intimidation inside the camp by Interahamwe and rumours of anti-Hutu violence in Rwanda.²⁰⁶

The Zairean president Mobutu held sympathies for the fallen Hutu regime and provided them with a rear base in the Kivus for training and rearming.²⁰⁷ Camps served as an ideal recruitment ground as well. Refugees were frequently coerced into becoming soldiers, physically by the armed factions operating inside the camps, or by the existing conditions. As work opportunities were almost non-existent and as many aid organisations had been withdrawing, the socio-economic situation was becoming ever more dismal.²⁰⁸ Young men inhabiting the camps often joined the various Hutu militia, which constituted the best available tool of social empowerment, as well as of chasing away boredom and inactivity.²⁰⁹ A clear parallel is discernible here with the early days of the RPF – before the 1990 invasion of Rwanda, as well as during the 1990-1993 insurgency in northern Rwanda, they also recruited mainly from diaspora populations of Rwandan Tutsi displaced in Uganda and

²⁰¹ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 230.

²⁰² STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 34.

²⁰³ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 24-25.

²⁰⁴ For instance: AUBENAS, Florence. "La longue marche du retour vers Kigali." *Libération*. 2.8.1994.

²⁰⁵ African Rights. *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*. London: African Rights, 1995, 657.

²⁰⁶ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 25.

²⁰⁷ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 25.

²⁰⁸ MURISON, Jude. "The Politics of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in the Congo War," 230.

²⁰⁹ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 31, 36.

Burundi.²¹⁰ Significant portions of a population moving to the area of a neighbouring state thus appear to implicate not only the creation of refugee settlements but also of rear bases and future war machines.

Inside the Rwandan refugee camps in the Congo, popular leaders were elected to front for the hidden political leadership, which quickly gained control over the distribution of food supplies and aid.²¹¹ The political and military leadership refused to allow UNHCR to count the refugees for over half a year, inflating their numbers to pocket surplus food and goods for themselves.²¹² The size of the refugee population they controlled was thus clearly of crucial importance for elites, as a means to power and finances.

Refugee leaders were not the only ones who used refugee populations to their own benefit. Mobutu also saw a political and financial opportunity in the camps. They helped him to re-establish closer ties with former allies and the international community, as he pledged to be seriously concerned about the security and humanitarian situation in the camps, as well as about the problem of violence in border zones. In the background, he continued to support the rearmament of the camps though.²¹³ Financially, the camps attracted an enormous amount of international aid – donors spent about two billion dollars over 1994 to 1996 at the maintenance of the camps and at providing for the approximately two million refugees residing in them. This financial inflow clearly benefited, to some extent, political elites as well. As a comparison, humanitarian aid for Rwanda, which had two and a half times as many people (over 5 million), was around 900 million dollars over the same period,²¹⁴ leaving the Kigali regime infuriated.²¹⁵

The presence of ex-FAR and Interahamwe militants inside the camps, as well as the suitable conditions for recruitment, resulted in armed infiltrations from the camps into the northwest of Rwanda in as early as October 1994.²¹⁶ The fact that a substantial number of militiamen concealed as refugees had arrived to the camps, was undoubtedly of great significance for the eruption of violence along the Rwandan borders. The presence and size of the displaced civilian population was, however, extremely important as well, for militants

²¹⁰ MURISON, Jude. "The Politics of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in the Congo War," 230.

²¹¹ POTTIER, Johan. "Relief and Repatriation: Views by Rwandan Refugees and Lessons for Humanitarian Aid Workers." *African Affairs*. No. 95 (1996): 403-429.

²¹² TERRY, Fiona. *Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002, 186-187.

²¹³ PRUNIER, Gerard. *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, 376.

²¹⁴ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 30.

²¹⁵ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 34.

²¹⁶ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 26.

relied on it for new recruits and sympathisers, who could provide supplies, information, or transmit messages.

From the case of the refugee camps, it thus seems evident that population shifts matter for conflict eruption. Political considerations by elites for using these masses appear, however, to be of even greater importance. Large population change is not a sufficient condition for this population to incite or engage in conflict and substantially change the distribution of power; human masses are, however, an effective tool in the hands of the political leadership.

2.4.1. Kivu provinces

The already described massive population shift affected in the first place the Kivu provinces in eastern Congo, immediately bordering Rwanda and Burundi. The influx into the Kivus of some 200,000 Burundian refugees at the end of 1993, followed by approximately 1.5 million Rwandans in mid-1994 created an insufferable situation security-wise, as well as economically.²¹⁷ In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, a substantial number of refugees (around 470,000) fled to Tanzania too. However, they did not trigger by far as many tensions and problems as the refugees who fled to Congo. This clearly demonstrates that swift demographic change is not a sufficient condition for conflict eruption.

Three major factors distinguish the cases of the Kivus and Tanzania. Firstly, most of the former political elites, the defeated Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), as well as the Interahamwe militia, settled down in the Kivus. The structure and later the organisation of the arriving masses therefore differed greatly from that in Tanzania. The presence of a relatively organised military and political leadership in the Congolese camps enabled more effective mobilisation, recruitment, and was a source of structuring collective action. This difference between the two countries affected by strong immigration demonstrates that large population shifts and the existence of opportunities and motives to engage in violence is not sufficient for conflict outbreak – some degree of elite coordination is necessary. A strong analogy is discernible between this finding and Green's claim that apart from the above mentioned factors, collective action and mobilisation are also necessary for the eruption of conflict *over land*.²¹⁸ It appears that this assumption can also be applied to population-change induced violent conflict more generally.

²¹⁷ REYNTJENS, Filip. *The Great African War*, 2.

²¹⁸ See page 13.

GREEN, Elliott. "The Political Demography of Conflict in Modern Africa," 13.

Secondly, socio-political conditions in the two host countries also varied considerably. Tanzania was relatively politically, socially, and fiscally stable at the time of the refugee influx. Thanks to these factors, and correspondingly with Goldstone's theoretical model,²¹⁹ it showed great resistance to the risk factor posed by migration induced population change. It also did not tolerate foreign military build-up on its own territory, in the way Mobutu did. To the contrary, the Kivus had been since long a complex and volatile region, where successive migratory waves, demographic pressure, and the peripheral status of the provinces created an environment which could serve as an epicentre of uprisings and conflict.²²⁰

Thirdly, Tanzanian political elites responded to the migrant influx by extending citizenship to tens of thousands of Rwandan refugees. In so doing, they significantly reduced the probability of the refugees becoming a separate, alienated population, and enabled the absorption of the new arrivals by the already sizeable Hutu community in Tanzania. Through inclusive citizenship laws, Tanzanian authorities managed to unite (to a certain degree) the country's population. On the other hand, Mobutu's "divide and rule," which included the revocation of the citizenship of Tutsi residing in the country for decades, provoked alienation and clashes between the Tutsi, autochthons, as well as Hutu militia, and pushed the Congolese Tutsi into alliances with the Rwandan regime.²²¹

The Kivu region represented in a way an extension of the ethnic and political problems of Rwanda itself. With its high-density population, interwoven by demographic and tribal contradictions, it was easy to foresee the destabilising effect that the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees, with a militant leadership, plenty of weapons, and a history of recent genocide, were to have when they suddenly burst upon this fragile human environment.²²²

While the Kivus served as a geographical link for the spreading fire of ethnic tension in the region, the conflicts in the Kivu provinces cannot be seen as purely a continuation of the Rwandan genocide, or as an attempt at annihilating the largely Tutsi South Kivu Banyamulenge and other North Kivu Tutsi by Rwanda-inspired Hutu extremists.²²³ The Kivu conflicts are much more complicated and encompass the issues of identity, demographics, citizenship, politics, land ownership, as well as memories of previous waves of ethnic strives. The political precedents and motivations for engaging in a new round of violence aimed at

²¹⁹ See page 11.

GOLDSTONE, Jack A. "Population and Security," 8.

²²⁰ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 46-47.

²²¹ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 238-239.

²²² PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 46-47.

²²³ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 53.

redressing past grievances and gaining new superiority were already strong. The massive refugee flow, which changed the population and power balance, only provided the necessary trigger, as well as the needed mobilising rhetorical tools.²²⁴

Apart from the already mentioned factors, the eruption of conflict was facilitated by a sort of state collapse which was characteristic of Mobutu's late rule not only in the Kivu provinces but virtually in the whole country.²²⁵ In the Kivus, Mobutu's politics of "divide and rule" were further fanning existing ethnic hatred, which contributed to the mounting tensions between autochthon tribes and Kinyarwanda speakers over matters such as identity, citizenship, and access to rights.²²⁶

2.5. First Congo War

As has been demonstrated, the Rwandan genocide and the subsequent exodus of refugees mingled with *génocidaires* had devastating consequences for the neighbouring Congo.²²⁷ They were the most important immediate cause of the eruption of the First Congo War, while the decay of Mobutu's state and army, as well as existing ethnic tensions, provided an equally important context.²²⁸

By 1996, tensions have increased sharply between the Mobutu regime and the RPF. With Mobutu's blessing, the ex-FAR reorganised and rearmed in the Congolese refugee camps and launched attacks into Rwanda and against the Tutsi Banyamulenge in South Kivu. Apart from recruiting inside the camps, they were also using Zairean Hutu to develop their local power-base.²²⁹ Rwanda reacted at the continuing operations of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe militia on its territory with targeted strikes against the camps already in July 1995.²³⁰ The first major and frontal Rwandan assault against the refugee camps occurred in September 1996. Its primary target was to remove the border threat posed to the new Rwandan leadership by the remnants of the former regime, who were rearming under the cover of the refugee camps.²³¹ The initially strictly military ambitions of the Rwandans soon expanded, however, as security and geopolitical concerns were joined by political and later economic ones.

²²⁴ REYNTJENS, Filip. *The Great African War*, 15.

²²⁵ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 47.

²²⁶ DUNN, Kevin C. "A Survival Guide to Kinshasa," 55.

²²⁷ Human Rights Watch. *Rwanda: Justice After Genocide – 20 Years On*. 28 March 2014 [accessed 28.3.2016]. Available from: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/28/rwanda-justice-after-genocide-20-years>.

²²⁸ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 113.

²²⁹ DUNN, Kevin C. "A Survival Guide to Kinshasa," 55-57.

²³⁰ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 41.

²³¹ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 75.

When in September 1996, the RPA crossed the Rwandan-Congolese border, it found virtually nothing in its way. The military campaign against the camps succeeded with ease, tempting the attackers to overthrow the hated Mobutu regime, which had been providing safe haven to foreign rebel forces.²³² What the Rwandan leadership failed to appraise, however, was the possible magnitude of the violence it was unleashing. Mobutu was a thorn in the side of several of his neighbours, which were all eager to grab the opportunity to install a friendly government in the Congo. At the same time, however, they brought with themselves an array of particular conflicts, each with its own logic, history, and independent actors, which combined with local Congolese problems turned the vast Congo Basin into an arena for continental war.²³³

Simultaneously, a Tutsi Banyamulenge rebellion against Mobutu was underway in South Kivu, sparked mainly by threats to expel Zairean Tutsi from the country and by the revocation of their citizenship rights.²³⁴ Alienation and tensions were further whipped up by the RPA's recruitment of Zairean Tutsi on the one hand, as well as by anti-Tutsi demagogues on the other hand.²³⁵ The ongoing Banyamulenge rebellion came in useful for the Rwandan leadership, which found it more favourable to give a Congolese face to their attempt at overthrowing Mobutu. They allied with the ethnically close Banyamulenge, as well as with other opposition factions, and facilitated the creation of a new Congolese rebel movement, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL – Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaïre). This loose political and military alliance, nominally led by the former Marxist rebel Laurent-Désiré Kabila,²³⁶ launched assaults at the refugee camps and the Zairean army in October 1996.²³⁷ Rwanda initially denied any military or political involvement in the rebellion, already in 1997, however,

²³² Despite the ease of the invasion, neither Rwanda nor Uganda or other participating country later over the course of the war and in its aftermath, attempted to redraw the boundaries of the Congo. This fact attests the significance of the principle of territorial integrity in post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa.

HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 104.

²³³ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 75-80.

²³⁴ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 242.

²³⁵ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 94.

²³⁶ Laurent-Désiré Kabila was born in Katanga Province in eastern Congo. In the 1960s he was a youth leader associated with Patrice Lumumba and was engaged in a Lumumbist revolt which was eventually suppressed in 1965 by the Congolese army led by Mobutu. In the late 1960s he established a Marxist territory in the Kivu region.

Encyclopædia Britannica. "Laurent Kabila." *Encyclopædia Britannica Online* [accessed 3.4.2016]. Available from: <http://www.britannica.com/biography/Laurent-Kabila>.

²³⁷ DUNN, Kevin C. "A Survival Guide to Kinshasa," 56.

Kagame disclosed to Washington Post that Rwanda was involved in planning the revolt since early 1996.²³⁸

AFDL rebels in the east became soon embroiled in bitter feuds between communities over power and land.²³⁹ The natural-resource richness of the Kivus was also playing an increasingly important role in the Rwandan orchestrated assault.²⁴⁰ The advancing AFDL rebel forces recruited mainly among the Banyamulenge of South Kivu, but as the recruitment of adult soldiers sometimes proved difficult, they also widely used *kadogo*, i.e. child soldiers. The environment of urban slums and refugee camps offered a steady supply of unemployed, impoverished, and disaffected youth from various eastern tribes, who were eager to join the rebellion and who could be recruited at very low costs. Later they proved to be exceptionally loyal to Kabila,²⁴¹ whom they referred to as *Mzee*, i.e. “old man”, an expression of quasi-filial respect in the Swahili language.²⁴²

Refugees from camps attacked by the advancing AFDL forces fled first to Mugunga camp near Goma, which was holding some 800,000 people by early November 1996. When fighting started around Mugunga, the ex-FAR and Hutu militia largely withdrew, leaving the roughly one million refugees in a state of panic and confusion.²⁴³ The refugees then split up into three main groups. The largest returned to Rwanda, to the immense relief of the international community struggling to provide for the refugees amassed in Congolese camps. The second group fled westwards, deeper into the Congolese jungles. The third rather small group moved further to a third country.²⁴⁴ Many were left unaccounted for and as reports of RPA massacres of remaining Hutu refugees emerged,²⁴⁵ it became increasingly unclear whether the refugees were caught in the middle of a battle or were its target.

What is certain, however, is that very roughly half a million people returned home to Rwanda in only three days in November 1996.²⁴⁶ Rwanda alleged that virtually all those who fled into the Congolese interior were ex-FAR and Interahamwe sympathisers with no intention of returning to Rwanda. They estimated the remainder of the refugees to be in the tens of thousands and put the maximum figure to 200,000. International organisations present

²³⁸ POMFRET, John. “Rwandans Led Revolt In Congo.” Washington Post. 9 July 1997.

²³⁹ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 94.

²⁴⁰ DUNN, Kevin C. “A Survival Guide to Kinshasa,” 56.

²⁴¹ YOUNG, Crawford. “Contextualizing Congo Conflicts,” 26.

²⁴² PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 251.

²⁴³ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 118-120.

²⁴⁴ MURISON, Jude. “The Politics of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in the Congo War,” 229.

²⁴⁵ PRUNIER, Gerard. “The Geopolitical Situation in the Great Lakes Area in Light of the Kivu Crisis.” *Writenet*. February 1997.

²⁴⁶ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 44.

on the ground asserted, however, that in reality up to 600,000 Hutu refugees had fled into the jungles, many with no choice of turning towards Rwanda as it would have involved heading into advancing AFDL forces.²⁴⁷

The general uncertainty on even rough numbers stems from the lack of a credible starting figure. According to the approximations of the UN,²⁴⁸ as well as other international donors,²⁴⁹ there were about 1.1 million refugees in Congolese camps before the AFDL assault began. Rwanda claimed, however, that this number had been overstated in order to ensure that there is no food or medicine shortage in the camps. The ex-FAR and the former Rwandan government did not allow a census to be conducted in the camps for months, allowing them to inflate their population to receive more aid which they were then administering. Doctors Without Borders estimated that at the point when fighting began there were around 950,000 refugees in the camps. Between 400,000 and 650,000 of these refugees were thought to have returned to Rwanda in the early days of the AFDL invasion, while another 320,000 were settled in camps administered by the UN or were repatriated over the course of the year 1997.²⁵⁰

The enfolding war of numbers had also another, more political, aspect, apart from the amount of aid received. It played a pivotal role in the diplomatic contestation over whether or not there should be a multinational intervention force deployed in eastern Congo. “[M]any Zairian politicians believed they would be saved by the arrival of a multinational intervention force with a humanitarian agenda of feeding one million Hutu refugees. By stopping the rebel operations such an intervention could [have] allow[ed] the Army to recapture lost ground and shore up the tottering regime.”²⁵¹ The apparent return of hundreds of thousands of refugees to Rwanda suddenly changed the picture, however, and no intervening force materialised, favouring the advance of Rwandan backed AFDL troops. In order to reinforce the impression that the refugee crisis had been solved, the AFDL systematically restricted access for journalists, aid organisations, as well as international human right investigators to the remaining refugees.²⁵²

²⁴⁷ REYNTJENS, Filip. *The Great African War*, 85.

²⁴⁸ EMIZET, Kisangani. “The Massacre of Refugees in Congo: A Case of UN Peacekeeping Failure and International Law.” *Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 33, No. 2 (2000): 163-202.

²⁴⁹ MASSEY, Simon. “Operation Assurance: The Greatest Intervention That Never Happened.” *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*. 15 February 1998 [accessed 3.4.2016]. Available from: <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/operation-assurance-greatest-intervention-never-happened>.

²⁵⁰ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 136.

²⁵¹ *Financial Times*, November 16-17, 1996. Quoted in PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 122-123.

²⁵² PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 146.

Given this extreme subjectivity and variability of figures, depending on who and with what intention was issuing them, it is extremely difficult to estimate how many refugees had gone missing during the camp disaster. UNHCR official figures accord a “location unknown” status to more than 200,000 refugees.²⁵³ A survey by Doctors Without Borders, based on eyewitness accounts of 266 randomly selected refugee families, reports that on average 19.7 percent of each family’s members were killed, 59.6 percent were lost from sight during the flight and 17.5 percent reached the examined refugee camp between September 1996 and May-June 1997.²⁵⁴

The question arises what happened to those whose location remained unknown. Rwandan, as well as some international media alleged that all those willing were repatriated by the AFDL to Rwanda, separating them from Hutu militants who “virtually held them hostage.”²⁵⁵ A 2010 UN report found, however, that the advancing AFDL and Rwandan soldiers may have been guilty of acts of genocide against the Hutu refugees. The report bases its conclusion on the “apparently systematic and widespread nature of the attacks, which targeted very large numbers of Rwandan Hutu refugees and members of the Hutu civilian population.”²⁵⁶ It also reveals that “[t]he majority of the victims were children, women, elderly people and the sick, who posed no threat to the attacking forces.”²⁵⁷ According to Alison Des Forges, one of the prominent chroniclers of the Rwandan genocide, this widespread use of violence was a deliberate attempt by the RPF at preventing the creation of another Rwandan refugee diaspora which might one day, like the RPF did in its early history, return to threaten its regime.²⁵⁸

In less than a year, the AFDL backed by Rwandan forces seized Kinshasa, causing Mobutu to flee to exile. Kabila took control, renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of the

²⁵³ UNHCR. *The State of The World's Refugees 1997: A Humanitarian Agenda*. 1 January 1997. Fig. 1.4: Displacement of Rwandese and Burundian refugees, 1996-97 [accessed 4.4.2016]. Available from: <http://www.unhcr.org/3eb789912.html>.

²⁵⁴ NABETH, Pierre, CROISIER, Alice, PEDARI, Mirdad, BRADOL, Jean-Hervé, Epicentre, and Médecins Sans Frontières. “Were Acts of Violence Committed Against Rwandan Refugees?” *The Lancet*. October 1997 [accessed 4.4.2016]. Available from: <http://speakingout.msf.org/en/node/1025>.

²⁵⁵ MACKINLEY, James. “How the Refugee Crisis Wound Down.” *International Herald Tribune*. 28 November 1996. Quoted in PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 144.

²⁵⁶ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. *Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003*. August 2010, 280-281 [accessed 4.4.2016]. Available from: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_EN.pdf.

²⁵⁷ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. *Report of the Mapping Exercise*, 279.

²⁵⁸ STEARNS, Jason, BORELLO, Federico. “Bad Karma: Accountability for Rwandan Crimes in the Congo.” In STRAUS, Scott, WALDORF, Lars. *Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence*. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2011, 155.

Congo and declared himself president of the country.²⁵⁹ Due to the heavy Tutsi and Banyamulenge leadership of both the AFDL and the new Kabila government, it was seen as a puppet regime installed by Rwandan and Congolese Tutsi.²⁶⁰ Longstanding anti-Tutsi sentiments in the Congo were thus, after years of exploitation by Mobutu, further exacerbated by Kabila's siding with the embattled Banyamulenge, drawing them even deeper into a symbolic association with the despised Rwandan Tutsi.

In the Kivus, local Congolese chiefs were replaced with Tutsi, and Rwandans came to occupy top posts in the new army high command.²⁶¹ Kabila's neglect of the volatile east and his insensitivity to the already upset ethnic power balance led to the upspring of autochthon militias (the Mai-Mai), made up of young, unemployed, and disaffected men fighting against the Tutsi in the Kivus.²⁶² The Mai-Mai phenomenon was the result of the combination of a number of factors, the most important of which was the existence of a substantial youth bulge. In 1996, approximately 35 percent of the adult (15 and above) Congolese population was aged between 15 and 24.²⁶³ According to Urdal's theory,²⁶⁴ the incidence of youth bulges in a context of, among others, continued high fertility, economic decline, and high unemployment increases the risk of conflict eruption significantly, as it provides both the motive for engaging in violent action, and the opportunity due to the low cost of rebel recruitment. All the listed circumstances were present in the Kivus in 1996, arguably not only increasing the risk of conflict but also its scale, and making it intractable.

In North Kivu, the conflict was particularly sharp, as given the favourable political conditions in the early period of the Kabila regime, some Tutsi pastoralists had moved over from Rwanda and Uganda with their livestock and were trying to settle on the lands of the locals. Coupled with the already described political grievances of the native population, this caused massive retaliation against the Tutsi in the Kivus, whether new arrivals or living there for generations.²⁶⁵

²⁵⁹ MCCALPIN, Jermaine O. "Historicity of a Crisis," 47.

²⁶⁰ DUNN, Kevin C. "A Survival Guide to Kinshasa," 61.

²⁶¹ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 175.

²⁶² STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 263.

²⁶³ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. *World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision*. Data acquired via: <http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/>.

²⁶⁴ See page 15-16.

URDAL, Henrik. "A Clash of Generations?" 610-611.

²⁶⁵ Nations Unies, Département des Affaires Humanitaires / IRIN. "Bulletin quotidien no 245 d'information sur la région des Grands Lacs." 10 September 1997 [accessed 4.4.2016]. Available from: <http://reliefweb.int/report/rwanda/bulletin-quotidien-no-245-dinformation-sur-la-region-des-grands-lacs-du-mercredi-10>.

The constant low intensity conflict between Kivu militia and Rwandan soldiers had grave security and political implications for Rwanda. The thousands of Tutsi fleeing violence in North Kivu settled in large refugee camps in northwest Rwanda, where they became part of an already highly volatile environment made up of Rwandan Hutu refugees repatriated in November 1996. As for the political implications, the ongoing violent skirmishes in eastern Congo reinforced hard-liners on Rwanda's domestic political scene.²⁶⁶

2.5.1. Repatriation to Rwanda and its consequences

The repatriation of Rwandan refugees who fled to eastern Congo in the aftermath of the genocide was attempted by Zairean authorities well before November 1996. It was also high up in the agenda of the international community. Repatriation started well with about 215,000 Hutu refugees returning to Rwanda in the second half of 1994. The news of the security situation inside Rwanda and of the ongoing crackdown on the Hutu community halted the process, however, and caused a new refugee inflow instead.²⁶⁷

In the second half of 1995, instability was growing in the Kivus with the ex-FAR strengthening its grip on the refugee camps and allying with local Zairean Hutu. Further escalating violence, the Zairean government threatened to expel the Rwandan refugees, who moved from the camps in response and tried to settle, clashing with natives, as well as Tutsi Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge, whose land they threatened to occupy.²⁶⁸ As a result of these clashes, around 60,000 Zairean Tutsi (both natives and refugees of the 1959 Rwandan massacres) fled to Rwanda by mid-1996.²⁶⁹ The RPF regime refused to integrate the refugees, however. In a similar vein to the Mobutu regime, as was described previously, it forced the UNHCR to set up camps next to the Congolese frontier, virtually facing the Hutu refugee camps on the other side of the border. Young Zairean Tutsi in the camps were quickly militarized through RPA training.²⁷⁰

Despite its complexities, the push at the repatriation of Rwandan refugees was enormous, not only from the side of the host countries, but also from the international community.²⁷¹ As described by Herbst,²⁷² in the post-colonial era of salient borders, African

²⁶⁶ PRUNIER, Gerard. "Rwanda: The Social, Political and Economic Situation in June 1997." *Writenet*. July 1997.

²⁶⁷ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 55.

²⁶⁸ REYNTJENS, Filip. *The Great African War*, 17.

²⁶⁹ Human Rights Watch. *Forced to Flee: Violence Against the Tutsis in Zaire*. 1 July 1996 [accessed 4.4.2016]. Available from: <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Zaire.htm>.

²⁷⁰ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 57-58.

²⁷¹ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 144.

²⁷² See page 18.

countries were strongly in favour of repatriating refugees residing on their territories, as soon as it became possible, uprooting earlier migration and settlement patterns. Accordingly, the Mobutu regime threatened to expel all refugees on several occasions. Internationally, there was also significant pressure to repatriate Rwandan refugees, not only from Zaire but also from Tanzania, as providing for them proved to be extremely costly and complicated. From this emphasis it is apparent that the West attempted and failed to treat the consequences of the genocide and the subsequent refugee exodus with a politically blind humanitarianism. It handled “what was essentially a political problem as a humanitarian crisis”²⁷³ and it perceived the refugee population in terms of its size and the supplies needed, instead of its structure and internal complexity.

For the Kagame regime, the first serious security problems inside Rwanda emerged in the aftermath of the AFDL-Rwandan assault against refugee camps in eastern Congo. Along with the hundreds of thousands of refugees, streaming back into northwest Rwanda after the invasion, also some 10,000 to 15,000 hostile militants infiltrated the country.²⁷⁴ With this mass return of refugees in November 1996, the Rwandan civil war started up again, after a hiatus of three years. The security situation steadily deteriorated and by the end of 1997 numerous insurgent attacks had been carried out in the northwest against government installations and sympathisers. The insurgents typically used terror tactics, inflicting mostly civilian casualties. The Kigali regime knew well (from its own experience) the danger of such insurrections and reacted with overwhelming force, trying to persuade the population that they would suffer more if they collaborated with the rebels than if they did not.²⁷⁵

2.5.2. Other factors important in the outbreak of the First Congo War

The previous section has demonstrated how massive population change, in the form of the rapid influx of Rwandan refugees into eastern Congo, influenced the ethnic balance and power distribution, leading eventually to conflict. The interference of regional powers, which followed the refugee-triggered destabilisation of eastern Congo, was an important but by far

HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 230.

²⁷³ *Sunday Times* (London). 10 November 1996. Quoted in PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 58.

²⁷⁴ United Nations. *Final report of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda)*. S/1998/1096. 18 November 1998, 5 [accessed 4.4.2016]. Available from:

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1998/1096.

²⁷⁵ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 181-183.

not sufficient cause of the eruption of the First Congo War. A multiplicity of factors had been for years creating certain local conditions which were necessary for the outbreak of the war.²⁷⁶

One of these factors was the shambling economy, devastated by the general mismanagement characteristic of the Mobutu era. During Mobutu's rule, the population of the Congo was growing at approximately three percent annually, while per capita food production showed a slow decline since the mid-1980s. The reason for this was that as cropping areas remained stable and production techniques failed to be developed, the stagnant agricultural output proved insufficient for the rapidly growing population. In the early 1990s, commercial agriculture, as well as mining and manufacturing, tumbled, and the monetary system was collapsing, giving way to the use of foreign currencies, barter, or attempts at self-subsistence. In 1995, only 4.5 percent of the population had payed employment.²⁷⁷ Infrastructure and industry had collapsed as a result of decades of negligence and mishandling, inflation was soaring, and real wages fell to less than half of their 1988 value by 1996.²⁷⁸ The increasingly urbanised youth with rising expectations was forced back into an autarkic economy, which was, however, by then devoid of any cultural justification or social prestige. The dire social conditions and economic outlooks provided a fertile ground for frustration and ethnic prejudice.²⁷⁹ Thus, when opportunity arose, many young people turned to soldiering as a means of fuelling their anger against a visible enemy, as well as a modest possibility for earning a living.²⁸⁰ By 1996, social and economic conditions were ripe in Zaire for ethnic and youth-led violence.

Multiple identities, ethnic ties, and the instrumentalisation of tribalism and ethnicity through the manipulation of political leaders also contributed to the creation of conditions under which conflict could spread with lightning speed and which explain its later intractability. The fact that complex ethno-regional identities could be easily restructured and exploited by elites following the mass arrival of the Rwandan refugees, as well as after the AFDL invasion, well demonstrates the role of political leaders in translating demographic change into political one.²⁸¹

The quick spread of the conflict and the ease of militia recruitment was probably facilitated to an even larger degree than tribalism by extreme poverty, corruption, and urban

²⁷⁶ REYNTJENS, Filip. *The Great African War*, 1.

²⁷⁷ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 161-163.

²⁷⁸ "Business at war." *Africa Confidential*. Vol. 38, No. 9 (1997).

²⁷⁹ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 163-164.

²⁸⁰ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 95, 144.

²⁸¹ BAZENGUISSA-GANGA, Rémy. "Les milices politiques dans les affrontements." *Afrique contemporaine*. No. 186 (1998): 55.

unemployment.²⁸² The legitimacy vacuum and lack of good governance, which had developed in the Congo during the Cold War due to a lack of accountability of the Western-backed Mobutu regime, have also taken their toll by decreasing the country's resilience and ability to react to potential risk factors.

The conditions for the outbreak of the First Congo War, and later for its channelling into a continent-wide conflict, were created also by the country's geopolitics. According to the typology of Jeffrey Herbst,²⁸³ the Congo is a classic example of a country with difficult political geography. It has an extraordinarily challenging population distribution with a large population density centred around the capital, Kinshasa, in the west, and other populous areas scattered discontinuously throughout its vast landmass. One of these areas of high population density is the Kivu region, lying on the Congo's eastern border more than 1,500 kilometres away from Kinshasa. The two are separated by extremely scarcely populated areas. The Congo can therefore also be characterised as a "rimland" country – a state with large population concentrations in its border regions and with a relatively empty interior.²⁸⁴ Such geopolitical endowments make it exceptionally hard for central authorities to project and exercise power in peripheral regions, largely contributing to instability.

Peripheries which fall beyond the authority of the central state usually develop their own power centres, often with economic, as well as ethnic links to neighbouring countries. Popular groups residing in remote peripheral areas are thus not only spatially distant from central authorities but can also be mobilised around ethnic and cultural symbols which may contest with the state.²⁸⁵ The close relations of these outlying groups with adjacent countries, as well as the fact that they are frequently economically underprivileged and ethnically distinct from the population of the state's official power centre, can consequently serve as potential facilitators of instability. The limited nature of most African countries' intelligence services, and in many cases also militaries, are further important factors enabling the eruption of violent conflict. Given the inadequacies of African states' security forces, rebellions can be launched regardless the countries' size. In the case of large states, however, it is more difficult to detect insurgencies in their early phases, as well as to crush them later on,²⁸⁶ which can lead to the outbreak of more potent insurgencies.

²⁸² PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 171.

²⁸³ See page 17-18.

HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 161.

²⁸⁴ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 146-147.

²⁸⁵ CLAPHAM, Christopher, HERBST, Jeffrey, MILLS, Greg, eds. *Big African States: Angola, Sudan, DRC, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2006, 10.

²⁸⁶ CLAPHAM, Christopher, HERBST, Jeffrey, MILLS, Greg, eds. *Big African States*, 238.

The above described adverse geopolitical preconditions should, despite their ability to signal some tendencies, in no way be considered as destiny. In the case of the Congo under Mobutu's mismanagement, however, they proved to be decisive. Mobutu never succeeded in extending his control over the entire Zairean state and as the end of his rule approached, his government lost control over most parts of the country. The political and economic collapse of Zaire made it impossible for the government to respond to the conflict triggered by the influx of refugees in the volatile east. The failure of the state led to regional war, as neighbouring countries repeatedly sought to impose such governments on the Congo which would comply with their security interests and concerns.²⁸⁷

Other circumstances playing a role in the outbreak of the First Congo War include the mistreatment of the refugee crisis by the international community. As France had been a traditional ally of Mobutu, while the US had been almost uncritically supportive of the RPF regime, the UN Security Council was incapable of intervening politically.²⁸⁸ Kagame reinforced this development with his rhetoric, reproaching the West for its inertness during the Rwandan genocide and alleging that it had no moral right to meddle with the RPF's decision to resolve the refugee issue by force.²⁸⁹ The overwhelming feeling of guilt towards Rwanda was a further source of inhibition among UN Security Council members to intervene.²⁹⁰ Kagame realised the power of this prevailing mood early on, and astutely exploited the human loss endured by Rwanda in his foreign policy and communication with the international community.

There is yet another aspect in which the international and especially humanitarian donor community failed. It has approached the refugee crisis as a purely humanitarian issue, neglecting the militarisation of the camps, overlooking the security and human rights situation inside Rwanda, and ignoring the underlying political dynamics of the unfolding conflict. The principal point on the donor community's agenda was from the very beginning of the crisis repatriation.²⁹¹ For this reason, it abstained from blaming the Kigali regime too much for the situation that arose, as doing so could have undermined repatriation efforts. Furthermore, the donor community largely perceived the provision of humanitarian aid and the process of

²⁸⁷ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 255-256.

²⁸⁸ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 34.

²⁸⁹ GOUREVITCH, Philip. "Continental Shift: A Letter from the Congo." *New Yorker*. 4 August 1997.

²⁹⁰ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 117.

²⁹¹ United Nations. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*. Blue Books Series vol. 10. New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996.

repatriation as quantitative and technical problems; the many more qualitative and political hindrances related to these issues received hardly any attention.²⁹²

On the other hand, the economic motivations of foreign powers do not appear to be among the most significant causes of the outbreak of the First Congo War. Foreign mining interests had been refuted by scholars as forces fuelling the war, among others because of the ensuing insecurity and chaos which slowed down the privatisation of the sector by about a decade. The RPF regime had local, and primarily security reasons to invade Zaire, the most powerful of which was to deny a power-base to the ex-FAR and Interahamwe dispersed among the refugee population.²⁹³ Toppling Mobutu and the greed for resources became significant motives only subsequently, during the course of the war and in its aftermath.²⁹⁴

To sum up, the collapsed Zairean state, complex regional alliances, the specific politics of identity, the ineptitude of the international community, as well as elites and local political dynamics, were all important variables which enabled that the Rwandan civil war could be transplanted, through the mass migration of refugees, across the borders to the Congo.²⁹⁵

2.5.3. The aftermath of the First Congo War

The First Congo War triggered another seemingly unending series of clashes in the Congo, which was determined mostly by the political and economic considerations of actors who appeared already in the First Congo War. The intractability of this conflict can be traced back, among others, to the particularly difficult political demography of the Congo. Wars in large states with non-contiguous areas of high population density, which description certainly matches the DRC, have a tendency to drag on because authorities based in the capital have difficulties to reach the rebels in the countryside, while they find it hard to march on and overthrow the central regime.²⁹⁶

The most intense confrontation in this protracted period of instability evolved during the Second Congo War (1998-2003) stemming from the deteriorating relations between Kabila and his Rwandan backers, which is estimated to have caused around 3.3 million excess deaths²⁹⁷ between the beginning of the war in August 1998 and its formal end in July 2002.²⁹⁸

²⁹² PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 31-33.

²⁹³ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 137-142.

²⁹⁴ STEARNS, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 55.

²⁹⁵ REYNTJENS, Filip. *The Great African War*, 1.

²⁹⁶ HERBST, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa*, 179.

²⁹⁷ Excess deaths are calculated by subtracting the average mortality rate before the war from the death rate during the war.

After the end of the war low intensity conflict continued, especially in the east of the country, where the disarming and reintegration of Mai-Mai militias proved to be highly problematic. The reason for this was the largely privatised nature of fighting, involving economic predation and looting not only as means of financing the conflict but also as ways of self-subsistence. The extremely limited economic alternatives and the resulting difficulties to reintegrate combatants into the civilian society have been among the prime reasons for the intractability of the war in the east.²⁹⁹

The privatisation of the conflict by individual fighters and the transformation of organised combat into a myriad of socially and economically motivated sub-conflicts also explains the high number of civilian deaths, most of which were not directly combat-related. As fighting in the east occurred usually on the village level between different ethnic groups and in a highly decentralised manner, civilian populations were strongly affected. Permanent insecurity, looting militants, and the waves of refugees and internally displaced persons caused famine, as well as the outbreak of diseases, which instigated high civilian casualty figures even with decreasing military intensity of clashes.³⁰⁰ The unresolved demographic, agrarian, ethnic, and economic problems of the east, which stood at the root of the First Congo War in the 1990s, thus perpetuated the conflict in the east in the new millennium.

²⁹⁸ COGHLAN, Benjamin et al. *Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Ongoing Crisis*. New York: International Rescue Committee, 2008, ii.

²⁹⁹ PRUNIER, Gerard. *From Genocide to Continental War*, 335-337.

³⁰⁰ According to estimates by the International Rescue Committee another 2.1 million excess deaths have occurred between the formal end of war in July 2002 and April 2007. COGHLAN, Benjamin et al. *Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, ii.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I have aimed at applying, testing, and further developing political demography theory by using it to examine the empirical case of eastern Congo. Using a political demography framework to analyse this case has proved to be worthwhile, as it had a remarkable explanatory value with respect to the scrutinized conflicts, which broke out in the aftermath of significant demographic change. The various theoretical models applied have shed some light on why population change had in some cases a stronger effect on the political and security situation than in others. Goldstone's assumptions related to the implications of changing power and resource distribution, Green's remarks on the significance of land, and Herbst's study of the changing salience and implications of citizenship, have proved to be of the greatest explanatory value within the entire political demography framework. To sum up, it appears to be worthwhile to look at demographic factors when studying conflict, for in combination with certain other variables,³⁰¹ rapid population change increases the risk of conflict eruption significantly.

The coincidence of demographic change with other independent variables, defined by the respective theoretical models of political demography, does not appear, however, to be fully sufficient to account for conflict outbreak. Therefore, the analytical scope of political demography theory should be expanded to take into account the ways in which factors such as how population change is perceived, reacted to, manipulated with, and exploited, facilitate conflict outbreak.

To justify this appeal, I look first at the level of perception. One of the determining factors of whether large-scale migration will instigate conflict, is how migrants are perceived by local populations. In the case of both Uganda and the Kivus in the post-colonial period, Rwandan refugees were perceived as foreigners, with no right to settle down permanently or be fully integrated into their host societies. In both cases, this perception was a major cause of the migrants' joining of militant rebel movements, as well as of clashes with natives. Likewise, the interaction of communities with each other is not determined solely by their relative size and power, or by their changes, but also by the perception of these figures. Similarly, it is not enough to examine whether a migrant group is factually challenging the dominance of a local one on a certain territory, a simple threat of doing so is equally worth to study.

³⁰¹ Such as land pressure, economic decline, state failure, continued high fertility, ethnic heterogeneity, changing ethnic and power balance etc.

The political and security implications of demographic change are also strongly affected by the reaction to it from the side of political elites. In the wake of the Rwandan refugee exodus to eastern Congo, Mobutu stepped up his “divide and rule” politics in dealing with ethnic heterogeneity, instead of trying to unify his country’s population by extending citizenship rights, as Tanzania did. Another example of political calculations fuelling violence was the RPF’s fear of the creation of a refugee diaspora in eastern Congo which may once return to threaten its regime, and the subsequent decision by the Kigali regime to invade the area.

Manipulation with and exploitation of demographic change, especially by political elites, also significantly contribute to increasing the risk of population-inflicted tensions. The numbers of Rwandan refugees in Congo, for instance, were systematically under- or overestimated, depending on the political interests of the party issuing these figures. Among others, the purpose of this “numbers game” was, on the RPF’s side, to halt a multinational intervention in eastern Congo by downplaying the number of refugees, and on the ex-FAR’s side to secure more goods and supplies for themselves by inflating the refugee population. As for exploitation, sizeable numbers of displaced civilians without an opportunity to earn their livelihoods were used by camp militia in eastern Congo in the aftermath of the genocide, as well as in northwest Rwanda after the mass return of refugees in November 1996, for recruitment purposes, and for transferring information and supplies. To paint a fair picture of the elites-population relationship, however, another way of perceiving the civilians exploited by camp leaders has to be added as well. Namely, it is the power of the human and physical resources at leaders’ disposal to condition their decision-making. In other words, elites in the context of the camps are, to a certain degree, dependent on the population they control, even if for instance no form of taxation is in place.

To sum it all up, the above outlined broader and somewhat constructivist variant of political demography theory could, in my opinion, be appropriate to study more complex causal mechanisms between population change and conflict, by widening the theory’s analytical scope to incorporate the role of perceptions, as well as elite response, manipulation, and exploitation.

The significance of political elites and charismatic leadership for translating demographic change into violent conflict has already been touched upon. The Congo case study has demonstrated on several occasions that while population change can lead to increased tensions and limited conflict between communities, it is hardly capable of inflicting war without coordination by an elite leadership. A larger emphasis should therefore be placed

in political demography theory on examining the role of political agency in the causal relationship between population change and conflict outbreak. Numbers and demographic indicators as political tools should be considered more thoroughly as well. Establishing clear causal links between population change and conflict may, however, prove to be difficult even when all the above mentioned factors are incorporated and taken into account.

To conclude, the selected case study has demonstrated that population change does matter for conflict outbreak. Given today's rapid population growth with unprecedentedly large youth cohorts in some of the most fragile areas of the planet, as well as the current trend of massive migration (conflict but also climate-induced), the research of the political and security implications of demographic change should receive more attention. At the same time, population increase should not be seen purely as a threat. As Herbst argues,³⁰² it could also be perceived as an opportunity for some states to extend control over larger shares of their population and thus actually increase stability. Similarly to geography, demographic growth should not be understood as destiny either. Its implications are strongly dependent on decisions, reactions, and perceptions of leaders, as well as affected communities, and therefore, more research should be conducted on how it can be turned into an advantage.

³⁰² See page 18-19.

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